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Abstract
We propose a conceptual framework for counterfactual and welfare analy-
sis for approximate models. Our key assumption is that model approximation
error is the same magnitude at new choices as the observed data. Applying
the framework to quasilinear utility, we obtain bounds on quantities at new
prices using an approximate law of demand. We then bound utility differences
between bundles and welfare differences between prices. All bounds are com-
putable as linear programs. We provide detailed analytical results describing
how the data map to the bounds including shape restrictions that provide a
foundation for plug-in estimation. An application to gasoline demand illustrates
the methodology.
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1 Introduction
Models are generally viewed as approximations. A common intuition in empirical
work is that conclusions of a model are robust to “small” amounts of approximation
error. Unfortunately, this intuition does not apply to many standard frameworks.
For example, when performing a revealed preference analysis [Varian, 1982], if a
dataset is inconsistent with a model, then counterfactual predictions described by
certain inequalities cross. Thus, if there is any violation of the model (no matter
how “small”), then the model fails to generate coherent counterfactual or welfare
statements.1
Alternatively, one can formally acknowledge approximation error throughout the anal-
ysis. Rather than treat approximation error as nonexistent, one can place restrictions
on the magnitude of the approximation error. This paper does so for counterfactual
and welfare analysis, with the following assumption on this magnitude.
Assumption 1. When making counterfactual predictions or measuring welfare
changes, we assume the approximation error of the model on the counterfactual pre-
dictions is the same as the approximation error of the model on the observed dataset.
This assumption is a natural extension of the standard approach to generate coun-
terfactual predictions that assumes that both the observed data and counterfactual
predictions are consistent with a model. We present a framework in which a model
can be used even though it is not exactly consistent with observed data. In particu-
lar, this paper assumes that the approximation error of the model on observed and
unobserved situations has the same magnitude. We call the counterfactuals that are
consistent with Assumption 1 adaptive counterfactuals because they adapt to approx-
imation error present in the observed dataset. This assumption can be questioned,
especially when the counterfactual setting is significantly different than observed data,
yet provides a way to conduct counterfactual analysis taking approximation error se-
riously.
The conceptual framework of this paper is general and can be applied to different
settings. In this paper, we formalize how to generate counterfactual predictions and
1Related concerns have been raised in the econometric literature on partial identification [Pono-
mareva and Tamer, 2011, Mu¨ller and Norets, 2016].
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measure welfare changes for the quasilinear utility model using the notion of ap-
proximation error from Allen and Rehbeck [2020]. In particular, we present bounds
on counterfactual quantities at new prices, differences of utility over consumption
bundles, and welfare differences involving a price change. The computation of all
bounds is facilitated by linear programming and we demonstrate the methods in an
illustrative empirical example using gasoline demand data from Blundell et al. [2012].
The quasilinear model is a suitable setting in which to study approximation error
because it is implicitly viewed as an approximation.2 The most common criticism is
that the model does not allow income effects. In addition, the model neglects dy-
namics, limited consideration, and peer effects, among many other omitted features.
We present a framework in which one does not need to pick a single story why the
baseline model is imperfect when generating counterfactual predictions on quantities.
However, to make welfare comparisons we take a stand on the interpretation of the
approximation error: the individual ranks bundles according to a quasilinear utility
function but for reasons we do not model explicitly, the choices do not exactly maxi-
mize the function. Overall, the framework we propose permits many reasons why the
baseline model is wrong, provided the approximation error is the same magnitude in
the counterfactual setting.
Despite being viewed as an approximation, the quasilinear model is widely used.
Examples include work in insurance choice [Einav et al., 2010, Bundorf et al., 2012,
Tebaldi et al., 2018] and public health [Cohen et al., 2010]. In addition, the quasilinear
structure is closely related to a large class of latent utility models (e.g. McFadden
[1981], Allen and Rehbeck [2019a]), and so the insights of this paper are directly
relevant beyond a setting with just prices and quantities. In particular, many latent
utility models used in applied work involve characteristics other than prices that shift
the desirability of goods but not the budget constraint.3
We now describe the framework in more detail. We begin by studing counterfactual
bounds for the demand of goods at new prices. We construct the counterfactual
bounds by looking for the maximal and minimal demand for each good in the pres-
2A notable exception that studies the approximation error explicitly is Willig [1976].
3Our analysis is also relevant for specifications in which latent utilities depend on a nonlinear
function of prices. For example, Berry et al. [1995] specifies that the utility of alternative j depends
on several observables including a term lnpm´ pjq where pj is the price of good j and m is income.
This is a quasilinear model in the variable p˜j “ lnpm´ pjq.
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ence of approximation error. We assume approximation error does not increase for
the counterfactual predictions relative to the dataset we have seen. This leads to
nontrivial restrictions on demand at new prices as long as the prices are not too low.
For each counterfactual price, this procedure gives an interval for lower and upper
demands for a given good.
For welfare analysis we view approximation error with a specific interpretation. In
particular, we assume an individual cannot perfectly maximize their utility function
because they are satisficers in the spirit of Simon [1947]. This means an individual
chooses quantities that are “close” to the maximum utility possible, but not neces-
sarily optimal. The interpretation of satisficing allows us to assign special welfare
significance to the latent utility over bundles. This utility over consumption bundles
is key for policy decisions involving the allocation of goods. In addition, we study
welfare over price changes, which is key for tax policy and other policy thought to
affect prices.
Two features limit the ability to measure welfare changes using data. First, the choices
we see do not exactly maximize utility, which leads to a “measurement wedge” on the
underlying utility function over bundles. Second, even if we knew the utility function
over bundles exactly, we do not know which approximately-optimizing choices will be
made at new prices. This leads to an additional “prediction wedge” when bounding
utility differences obtained at different prices.4
Taking into account these wedges, we present bounds on differences in utility over
consumption bundles and robust consumer surplus bounds involving price changes.
We present computational results for both bounds, as well as analytical results de-
signed to interpret specifically how the data are used to measure welfare changes.
These bounds generalize existing work in several directions: first, and most impor-
tantly, they are valid with approximation error; second, they apply to finite datasets
rather than requiring demand functions; third, the bounds apply to the (approxi-
mate) indirect utility at a new price without needing to first bound the quantity at
that price. In particular, we show that the bounds on (approximate) indirect utility
is a generalization of the standard integral definition of consumer surplus and we
4We thus complement the core analysis of Bernheim and Rangel [2009], which focuses on recov-
ering ordinal information on preferences over consumption bundles and does not distinguish between
these wedges.
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establish a close connection between counterfactual quantities and welfare bounds.
In order to understand how the counterfactual/welfare bounds depend on data and
prices, we present several shape restrictions. We are not aware of any work in the tra-
dition of Varian [1982] that discusses shape restrictions of the counterfactual/welfare
bounds (viewed as functions of data or counterfactual prices). Studying these shape
restrictions is important to understand how data are used in an empirical analysis.
For counterfactual quantities, we find that when there is a single good and the coun-
terfactual price changes, the upper and lower bounds on counterfactual demands are
each weakly decreasing in price. Thus, the upper and lower bounds on demand are
functions that satisfy the law of demand. For utility differences, we establish mono-
tonicity and continuity properties of the bounds as the quantities being compared
change. For a price change, the approximate indirect utility bounds satisfy convex-
ity and monotonicity conditions as prices vary; these are also key shape restrictions
for the indirect utility function for quasilinear utility.5 Finally, we establish sev-
eral convexity properties describing how quantities data map to the bounds. To our
knowledge these results are all new even under correct specification for quasilinear
utility.6
Our analysis also establishes that the bounds satisfy a key continuity property: as the
degree of approximation error limits to 0, our analysis limits to the analysis under
correct specification. In fact, we show a stronger property that the counterfactual
and approximate indirect utility bounds are jointly continuous when viewed as a
function of the quantities in the data and the degree of approximation error. This
facilities plug-in estimation of the bounds in which we replace true quantities with
estimated quantities. This is needed to cover our empirical application in which we
apply the framework with data on gasoline purchases used previously in Blundell
et al. [2012]. The data is a single cross section, and we pre-process the data as in
Blundell et al. [2012] by kernel smoothing. We conduct a representative agent analysis
with quantities (conditional means) estimated from the kernel smoothed data. Like
Blundell et al. [2012], we find that for several natural choices of the bandwidth,
5More specifically, convexity holds for the money metric version of the utility function. In general
one can only obtain quasiconvexity.
6The closest work appears to be a computational approach to describing bounds for models
related to quasilinear utility, without describing detailed shape restrictions [Chiong et al., 2017,
Tebaldi et al., 2018, Allen and Rehbeck, 2019a].
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demand is not downward sloping. Thus, it is inconsistent with the exact quasilinear
model. Nonetheless, the minimal degree of approximation error need to describe data
is small and welfare bounds are surprisingly narrow for all bandwidths we consider. In
contrast, the informativeness of the counterfactual bounds depends on the bandwidth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the related literature,
Section 2 describes the setup and conceptual framework of approximate counterfactu-
als for the quasilinear framework. Section 3 studies counterfactuals. Section 4 studies
welfare. Section 5 presents additional shape restrictions and discusses plug-in esti-
mation. Section 6 contains the application to gasoline demand. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Literature Review
This paper is part of a long literature that uses the revealed preference approach to do
counterfactual and welfare analysis. The primary model used is the general model of
utility maximization subject to a budget constraint, whose empirical content has been
characterized in Afriat [1967], Diewert [1973], and Varian [1982]. Recent econometric
work considering counterfactual or welfare bounds includes Blundell et al. [2003],
Blundell et al. [2008], Blundell et al. [2012], Blundell et al. [2014], Hoderlein and Stoye
[2015], Kline and Tartari [2016], Blundell et al. [2017], Cosaert and Demuynck [2018],
Aguiar and Kashaev [2018], Adams [2019], Cherchye et al. [2019], and Kitamura and
Stoye [2019]. Several proposals have been made to assess the fit of a model using
revealed preference tools, including Afriat [1973], Houtman and Maks [1985], Varian
[1990], and Echenique, Lee, and Shum [2011].7 Other papers outside of the revealed
preference literature that discuss fit of an approximate model include Kydland and
Prescott [1982], Vuong [1989], and Hansen and Jagannathan [1997]. The primary
way in which we differ from existing work is that we use a measure of fit to adjust
bounds on counterfactuals and welfare. In addition, relative to the general model
with income effects, which has been the focus of the revealed preference literature,
we conduct counterfactual analysis fixing prices at a new value without also fixing
expenditure.8
7See Allen and Rehbeck [2019b] for additional references and discussion of units.
8Work that uses revealed preference techniques to go beyond measuring the fit of the model in-
cludes Varian [1990], Halevy et al. [2018], and Gauthier [2019], which study parameter recoverability.
See also Chetty [2012] for a related approach.
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A growing econometric literature has studied sensitivity analysis and other ways in
which a model can be used formally viewing it as an approximation. Examples in-
clude Imbens [2003], Conley et al. [2012], Kline and Santos [2013], Andrews et al.
[2017], Manski and Pepper [2018], Masten and Poirier [2018a, 2019], Armstrong and
Kolesa´r [2018], Bonhomme and Weidner [2018], Christensen and Connault [2018],
d’Haultfoeuille et al. [2018], Fessler and Kasy [2019], Salanie´ and Wolak [2019], and
Andrews and Kwon [2019]. See Masten and Poirier [2018b] for additional references
and discussion. We differ from this work by focusing on a notion of approxima-
tion derived from approximate optimization. We complement the robustness ap-
proach [Hansen and Sargent, 2008] by focusing on the theoretical bounds for wel-
fare/counterfactuals rather than focusing on an optimal decision.
This paper is naturally related to other frameworks for welfare analysis that go be-
yond the classic revealed preference tradition. Our approach differs substantially
from an approach that posits individuals have consistent choices (that can be mod-
eled as solutions to a “decision utility”), but whose consistent choices do not reveal
the “true utility.” Subtleties with this approach have been discussed by Bernheim
and Rangel [2009] among others. A framework of “behavioral welfare analysis” is
presented in Bernheim [2016] and Bernheim and Taubinsky [2018], which provide
further summaries of what has become a large literature. Broadly, we differ from
welfare proposals in behavioral economics by addressing welfare questions given data
(only) on prices and quantities, without observing decision frames or other variables
thought to alter the choice process. In addition, when conducting welfare analysis
concerning price changes, we introduce the “prediction wedge” because given prices,
we do not know precisely what an individual would choose, even if utility were known
a priori.
2 Framework and Setting
The goal of this paper is to provide a framework where a researcher begins with a
baseline model that is taken seriously as an approximation. Since the model is an ap-
proximation, the researcher does not expect all data to be consistent with the model.
Nonetheless, the researcher may want to use the model for counterfactual and welfare
7
analysis. We present an adaptive framework framework for this by operationalizing
Assumption 1 for the quasilinear utility model. Recall that Assumption 1 maintains
that a researcher considers counterfactuals that are “no worse” than the observed
data. To do this, we enlarge the baseline model to fit the data, which introduces a
measurement wedge and prediction wedge. The measurement wedge concerns limits
on what an analyst can learn due to approximation error for objects defined in the
existing dataset (e.g. utility functions). The prediction wedge describes limits on
what can be said in new settings where the model may not be perfect (e.g. counter-
factual quantities). We formalize Assumption 1 by making these wedges as small as
possible while still fitting the observed data, using the notion of approximation error
from Allen and Rehbeck [2020]. We describe the framework more below.
We formalize the baseline model of quasilinear utility. A consumption bundle px, yq P
RK` ˆ R is evaluated according to upxq ` y, where u : RK` Ñ R is a utility function
over bundles x. The numeraire good is given by y and has a price of one. Given
prices p P RK`` and income I P R decisions in a quasilinear utility model follow
max
xPRK` ,yPR
upxq ` y ðñ max
xPRK`
upxq ` I ´ p ¨ x
s.t. p ¨ x` y ď I
where consumption of the numeraire good is allowed to be negative for unobserved
borrowing.9 We study the quasilinear utility model since it is regularly used in ap-
plications described in the Introduction, including adaptations to handle non-price
characteristics .10 In addition, it has a tractable notion of welfare in terms of units
of the numeraire.
Now we present an enlargement of the baseline model that relaxes the assumption of
exact maximization to a notion of approximate optimization. Because we focus on
the empirical analysis, we define the enlargement in terms of a finite datasets of the
form tpxt, ptquTt“1. There are T observations, quantities are weakly positive xt P RK` ,
and prices are strictly positive pt P RK``. Importantly, quantities can be discrete or
continuous, and 0 quantities are permitted in this framework.
9Allowing negative expenditure also avoids boundary issues for chosen consumption bundles.
10Allen and Rehbeck [2019a] show many applications including the additive random utility model
[McFadden, 1981] are quasilinear models with utility indices playing the role of prices.
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Definition 1. A dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1 is ε-rationalized by quasilinear utility for ε ě 0
if there exists a utility function u : RK` Ñ R such that for all t P t1, . . . , T u and for
all x P RK` , the following inequality holds:
upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ě upxq ´ pt ¨ x´ ε.
When ε equals zero, we say the dataset is quasilinear rationalized.
The value ε is in the same units as the price of the numeraire good, e.g. dollars per
time period. When ε ą 0, the observed bundles are within ε dollars of the maximum
utility possible at a given price. One interpretation is that ε captures “unstructured”
deviations from the quasilinear utility model (cf. Chetty [2012], Hansen and Sargent
[2018]), without a single interpretation of the nature of the deviations. Instead,
the magnitude of the deviations is controlled. This interpretation can be pursued
when making counterfactual predictions. In contrast, to make welfare predictions an
interpretation of the model is crucial. When discussing welfare, we follow Allen and
Rehbeck [2020] and interpret the value ε as a level of satisficing in the spirit of Simon
[1947]. In this case, a higher value of ε means there is a larger set of consumption
bundles that are “good enough” to be chosen.
When using the model for counterfactual or welfare analysis, a measurement wedge
and a prediction wedge arise. These concepts will become more clear when we turn
to specific analysis below, but we first provide an overview. When observed data
is not exactly consistent with a quasilinear utility model, the econometrician knows
there is no utility function that rationalizes the entire dataset, so at some observation
the quantity is not optimal. Thus, if a researcher still wants to use the quasilinear
model even when data is inconsistent with the baseline quasilinear model, then there
is a measurement wedge when trying to recover information about candidate utility
functions and indirect utility. Second, even after the econometrician has a set of
candidate utility functions that match the original dataset, the econometrician cannot
know that counterfactual choices will exactly maximize a candidate utility function.
Thus, there is a prediction wedge when forecasting even after recovering information
on the utility function.
We now discuss how to formalize Assumption 1 for the approximate quasilinear utility
model in relation to the measurement wedge and prediction wedge. Let εM denote
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the measurement wedge and εP denote the prediction wedge. In principle, the two
wedges may not be the same, but Assumption 1 allows us to treat these as equal.11
To further formalize Assumption 1, we introduce ε˚ as the smallest value of ε such
that the dataset is ε˚-rationalized by quasilinear utility. We also refer to ε˚ as the
level of approximation error or approximation error of the quasilinear utility model
for the observed dataset.
Proposition 1 (Allen and Rehbeck [2020]). Let ε˚ ě 0 be the smallest value such
that for all ε ě ε˚ the dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1 is ε-rationalized by quasilinear utility. The
value ε˚ exists and is obtained by a linear program.
We note that ε˚ is a function of the dataset to a number, so for a dataset D “
tpxt, ptquTt“1 we can write ε˚pDq. When we discuss only a single dataset, we typically
drop dependence on D. The value ε˚ will be used in our framework to place restric-
tions on the magnitude of the measurement and prediction wedges. Setting εM ě ε˚
formalizes that the measurement wedge is large enough to explain the data we have
seen. Similarly, setting εP ě ε˚ formalizes that the model is no better at predicting in
new settings than the data we have seen. We make these bounds as tight as possible,
and formalize Assumption 1 for this setting as follows.
Assumption 11. When performing counterfactual analysis, the measurement wedge,
prediction wedge, and approximation error of the model are equal,
εM “ εP “ ε˚.
This is a direct generalization of the standard approach to counterfactual and welfare
analysis, which sets εM “ εP “ 0. The conceptual framework of the standard ap-
proach only applies to models that perfectly fit the data, which translates to ε˚ “ 0
here. We later develop a framework for counterfactual and welfare analysis when the
measurement and prediction wedges are equal, εM “ εP . For notational convenience,
we will let ε denote the common value. Assumption 11 is the special case where ε “ ε˚.
11See Appendix B for additional discussion on this case and a more formal treatment of the
measurement and prediction wedges.
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3 Counterfactuals
For the quasilinear utility model with approximation error that does not exceed ε, we
consider sharp counterfactual bounds. More formally, we consider when the measure-
ment and prediction wedges are both equal to a single value ε. We impose ε “ ε˚ to
implement Assumption 11 and describe some properties on the counterfactual bounds.
In Section 3.1, we provide graphical intuition for the bounds. In Section 3.2, we de-
scribe how to compute bounds on quantities fixing a price. In Section 3.3 we describe
additional restrictions that can be imposed to tighten the bounds, such as a priori
bounds on expenditure at a new price.
To that end, for notational convenience, let D “ tpxt, ptquTt“1 denote the observed
dataset. Suppose we have a candidate quantity-price tuple px˜, p˜q. We can add this to
the original dataset to form an augmented dataset DYpx˜, p˜q. We consider candidates
such that the approximation error of the augmented dataset is bounded by ε. In
particular, the set of consistent demands and prices for the level of approximation
error ε is given by
CpD, εq “  px˜, p˜q P RK` ˆ RK`` | ε˚pD Y px˜, p˜qq ď ε( .
To check whether a candidate tuple px˜, p˜q is in CpD, εq, one can calculate ε˚ for the
augmented dataset using Proposition 1. If this measure of approximation error for
the augmented dataset is below ε, then the candidate tuple is in the set CpD, εq.
Our framework imposes Assumption 11 to generate counterfactual predictions assum-
ing the level of approximation error does not get worse. This amounts to setting ε
equal to the approximation error of the observed dataset. In particular, we focus on
the adaptive counterfactual set
ACpDq “  px˜, p˜q P RK` ˆ RK`` | ε˚pD Y px˜, p˜qq ď ε˚pDq(
“ CpD, ε˚pDqq.
We collect some facts about ACp¨q and Cp¨q.
11
Fact 1 (Constant Approximation Error). For any px˜, p˜q P ACpDq, we have
ε˚pD Y px˜, p˜qq “ ε˚pDq.
Thus, when a candidate observation in ACpDq is added to D, the measure of ap-
proximation stays the same. This follows from the construction of ACpDq. This
equality does not hold for all measures of model approximation error. For example,
if we had chosen to take ε˚ divided by the number of observations T as the measure
of approximation error, then Fact 1 would not hold in general since the measure of
approximation error for the augmented dataset would divide by T ` 1.
Fact 2 (Monotonicity). If ε ă ε1, then CpD, εq Ď CpD, ε1q.
Higher values of ε correspond to less informative counterfactual predictions. This
follows from the fact that if a dataset is ε-rationalized by quasilinear utility, then it
is also ε1-rationalized for ε ă ε1.
Fact 3 (Nonemptiness). CpD, εq is nonempty if and only if ε ě ε˚pDq.
This states that the observed data places a lower bound on the minimal amount of
approximation error needed to conduct counterfactual anlaysis. If ε ě ε˚, nonempti-
ness of CpD, εq is guaranteed by considering p˜ sufficiently high along each dimension
and x˜ “ 0. Alternatively, for the dataset D, when ε ă ε˚ even observations within
the dataset cannot be ε-quasilinear rationalized.
Fact 4 (Minimality). ACpDq is obtained from the smallest ε such that CpD, εq is
nonempty.
This formalizes that setting ε “ ε˚ for counterfactual values obtains the sharpest
restrictions under Assumption 11 subject to the constraint that counterfactuals are
nonempty. This follows from the previous facts. To perform a sensitivity analysis, one
could examine any ε ą ε˚ and use CpD, εq as the counterfactual set. Our framework
allows this yet focuses on ε “ ε˚.
3.1 Approximate Law of Demand
To gain intuition on the “shape” of the counterfactual sets CpD, εq and ACpDq, we
present a graphical description of the restrictions on counterfactuals. For exposition
12
we focus on some of the restrictions rather than all of them. First we describe a
restriction that must hold for a dataset to be ε-rationalized. At price pr we must
have
upxrq ´ pr ¨ xr ě upxsq ´ pr ¨ xs ´ ε
for some unknown function u. This states that xs cannot be much better than xr at
price pr. Flipping the role of observations r and s and basic algebra yields
1
2
pps ´ prq ¨ pxs ´ xrq ď ε. (1)
This is a multivariate approximate law of demand. The usual multivariate law of
demand obtains when ε “ 0. For a given value ε ě 0, this also places restrictions
on counterfactual demand x˜ at prices p˜ since for any r P t1, . . . , T u, a potential
counterfactual tuple must satisfy
1
2
pp˜´ prq ¨ px˜´ xrq ď ε. (2)
When we apply Assumption 11, we evaluate counterfacturals at ε “ ε˚. This inequal-
ity places a restriction on candidate quantity-price tuples when compared with any
observation in the dataset. In the one dimensional case (K “ 1), this states that
if the price increases from pr to p˜, then demand cannot increase by too much. The
bound on the increase in quantities is inversely related to the magnitude of the price
increase. That is, when p˜´ pr ą 0 we have x˜ ď xr ` 2ε
p˜´pr .
p
x
(a) Law of Demand
p
x
(b) Approximate Law of Demand
Figure 1: Restrictions of Law of Demand
We illustrate these bounds in two example datasets displayed in Figure 1. Each
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dataset has four observations respresented as black dots. The gray area denotes the
set of quantity-price tuples px˜, p˜q that are consistent with the existing dataset with
minimal level of approximation error ε “ ε˚. In panel (a), the observed dataset is
exactly consistent with quasilinear utility and the counterfactual set has ε “ 0. In this
case, the constructed bounds have the property that when price increases quantity
cannot increase. This leads to the “rectangular” bounds in panel (a). Note that for
low values of prices, quantity has a lower bound but not an upper bound. Similarly,
when prices are higher than any observed data the lower bound on counterfactual
demand is zero.
In panel (b), the dataset is not consistent with quasilinear utility, because there is
an instance in which price goes up and quantity goes up. Here we graphically obtain
the counterfactual restrictions using the approximate law of demand constructed from
Equation 2, setting ε “ ε˚.12 This approach leads to “hyperbolic” bounds, in contrast
with the rectangular bounds in panel (a). The fact that ε “ ε˚ is the minimal
approximation error needed to rationalize the data is demonstrated on the graph by
two points touching dashed hyperbolas.
3.2 Bounding Quantities
The sets Cp¨q and ACp¨q completely describe counterfactuals. An analyst may not be
interested in the entire set of counterfactual quantity-price tuples, but rather certain
features of it. For example, an analyst may only be interested in quantities at a fixed
counterfactual price p˜ P RK`` allowing approximation error ε. This set may be written
Xpp˜, D, εq “  x˜ P RK` | px˜, p˜q P CpD, εq( .
Our first question is when this set is nonempty, i.e. when can we conduct counterfac-
tual analysis.
Proposition 2. For a dataset D and counterfactual price p˜, the set Xpp˜, D, εq is
nonempty if and only if ε ě ε˚. Moreover, when ε ě ε˚ there is a concave, strictly
increasing, continuous utility function u : RK` Ñ R that ε-rationalizes the dataset and
12There are additional restrictions beyond Equation 2; here we provide a graphical illustration
but the general framework uses additional inequalities.
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has an exact maximizer for each p P RK``.13
This shows that by allowing enough approximation error, we can find counterfactual
quantities for any price. This is stronger than Fact 3 because it gives nonemptiness
of the counterfactual quantity set for any price. Existing work has studied when
observed datasets can be rationalized by quasilinear utility (Brown and Calsamiglia
[2007] for ε “ 0 or with certain random shocks) or an enlargement (Allen and Rehbeck
[2020] for ε ě 0). This strengthens those results by showing when we can conduct
counterfactual analsyis of quantities at a new price. The question is nontrivial because
the utility functions constructed in Brown and Calsamiglia [2007] and Allen and
Rehbeck [2020] to explain data have no approximate maximizer for low prices because
the indirect utility is infinite.14
We now discuss additional properties of Xpp˜, D, εq.
Proposition 3. For a dataset D “ tpxt, ptquTt“1, let ε ě ε˚. The set Xpp˜, D, εq is a
closed, convex polyhedron. In particular, x˜ P Xpp˜, D, εq if and only if the inequalities
pp˜´ ptM q ¨ x˜ ď pM ` 1qε` p˜ ¨ xt1 ´ ptM ¨ xtM ´
M´1ÿ
m“1
ptm ¨ pxtm ´ xtm`1q (3)
hold for all finite sequences ttmuMm“1 without cycles where tm P t1, . . . , T u and M ě 1.
When M “ 1, the inequalities in Equation 3 yield the approximate law of demand
described in Equation 2. In this case we compare an observation in the dataset with
a conjectured counterfactual tuple px˜, p˜q, which leads to two instances of ε in Equa-
tion 3, just like the approximate law of demand. Proposition 3 shows there are other
restrictions imposed on counterfactuals beyond the law of demand by considering
more than one observation at a time (M ě 2). These restrictions arise by adding
up additional sequences of inequalities similar to constructing the approximate law
of demand. By summing up appropriate sequences, the unknown utility function is
removed so restrictions on counterfactual quantities is given only using observable
data. We later use similar information to generate bounds on certain welfare objects.
13By strictly increasing we mean the usual definition, i.e. if each component of x is weakly
greater than each component of z, then upxq ě upzq, and if in addition some component of x is
strictly greater than the corresponding component of z, then upxq ą upzq.
14See the proof of Proposition 13. See also Aguiar et al. [2020] for recent work concerning
emptiness of counterfactual sets when using the weak axiom of revealed preference.
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Suppose now that we are only interested in bounding the quantity of the k-th good
at a price p˜, allowing up to ε approximation error. These bounds are extrema of
Xpp˜, D, εq along the k-the dimension. That is, they they are the extreme points of
the set
Xkpp˜, D, εq “ txk P R` | There is some x˜ P Xpp˜, D, εq with xk “ x˜ku.
The following proposition discusses the bounds for the k-th good. In particular, when
the bounds exist they can be computed by a linear program and the bounds satisfy
monotonicity properties with respect to the approximation error ε.
Proposition 4. For a dataset D, let ε ě ε˚. The bounds
xkpp˜, εq “ sup
xkPXkpp˜,D,εq
xk
xkpp˜, εq “ inf
xkPXkpp˜,D,εq
xk
can each be computed as a linear program whenever they are finite.
Under Assumption 11 (ε “ ε˚), these bounds cannot be improved.
The details on the linear program to compute bounds are found in Proposition A.1
of Appendix A. Recall Xkpp˜, D, εq is convex from Proposition 3. Thus, any quantity
between xkpp˜, εq and xkpp˜, εq is a candidate counterfactual quantity for good k.
Next we elaborate on when these bounds are finite. We show the lower bound is
always finite but the upper bound is finite only when prices are sufficiently high. To
formalize this define the upper comprehensive convex hull of a finite set tz`uL`“1 as
CCoptz`uL`“1q “
#
z P RK | z ě
Lÿ
`“1
α`z
` for some nonnegative α1, . . . , αL
such that
Lÿ
`“1
α` “ 1
+
.
The inequality in the definition here is componentwise. In addition, let intA denote
the interior of a set A.
Proposition 5. For a dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1, let ε ě ε˚. The upper bound xkpp˜, εq is
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finite if and only if p˜ P int CCoptptuTt“1q. The lower bound of xkpp˜, εq is always finite.
The upper bound xkpp˜, εq is weakly increasing in ε and the lower bound xkpp˜, εq is
weakly decreasing in ε.
Finally, we show that for one good pK “ 1q, the bounds on demand are downward
sloping in own-price.
Proposition 6 (Univariate Monotonicity). For a dataset D, let ε ě ε˚ and suppose
there is a single good (K “ 1). For any pair of prices p˜1, p˜0 P R``, it follows that
pxpp˜1, εq ´ xpp˜0, εqqpp˜1 ´ p˜0q ď 0
and
pxpp˜1, εq ´ xpp˜0, εqqpp˜1 ´ p˜0q ď 0.
When ε “ 0, the dataset satisfies the exact law of demand. When ε˚ (and K “ 1),
there is some pair of observations r, s P t1, . . . , T u that violates the law of demand so
pxr ´ xsqppr ´ psq ą 0.
Proposition 6 shows that while such violations can occur in the data, the bounds
themselves satisfy the exact law of demand.
Remark 1 (Sensitivity Analysis). If an analyst is unsure what is a sensible choice
of ε (other than the requirement ε ě ε˚), then it is possible to perform sensitivity
analysis of xkpp˜, εq and xkpp˜, εq as ε varies. A specific question is the largest amount
of approximation error in which one can still bound the quantity of the kth good by
a pre-specified value, e.g.
suptε ě ε˚ | xkpp˜, εq ď qku.
This bound is related the analysis of breakdown frontiers of Masten and Poirier [2019],
which involve the weakest assumptions under which one can reach a conclusion. Here,
weakest assumption translates to most approximation error.
Remark 2 (Other Bounds). It is straightforward to generalize Proposition 4 to bound
certain linear combinations of the candidate demand vector x˜. Bounds on such linear
combinations may be computed as the value of a linear programming problem. One
interesting linear combination is p˜¨x˜, which is the expenditure on the K goods. Sharp
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bounds on general functionals fpx˜q can also be described as the value of a constrained
optimization problem. For example, an upper bound is given by
sup
x˜PXpp˜,D,εq
fpx˜q.
Recall that Proposition 3 states this constraint set is a closed convex polyhedron.
This can facilitate computation though we do not formally study computation for
general f .
3.3 Expenditure Bounds
Additional assumptions can tighten the bounds on quantities in Proposition 4. For
example, one can assume that expenditure is the same at the counterfactual value
as the last period of data, so p˜ ¨ x˜ “ pT ¨ xT . Alternatively, one could place bounds
on the expenditures so that m ď p˜ ¨ x˜ ď m. One may also impose a priori bounds
on the quantities of other goods. These bounds can considerably shrink the set
of counterfactual bounds, especially when there are multiple goods. In addition,
computation with these additional restrictions is not challenging because these are
inequality constraints that can be appended to the original linear program. When
adding these additional constraints, however, it is possible that the counterfactual set
can be empty.
We emphasize that in general, such expenditure bounds are not needed to deliver
nontrivial counterfactual bounds. It is helpful to contrast our approach with the
general model of utility maximization subject to a budget constraint, with preferences
that need not be quasilinear. In the general model, even under correct specification
the sharp bounds on quantities of each good at a given price are the trivial bounds
r0,8q unless the analyst places a priori bounds on expenditure at the new price.15
This is because the general model does not rule out expenditure of 0 or arbitrarily
high values at counterfactuals when we only fix prices.16
15The bounds r0,8q are for bounding one good at a time (similar to xk and xk above). There
are nontrivial restrictions on the entire demand tuple.
16The results in Deb et al. [2018] can be used to show nontrivial bounds are possible in the
general model when income is always the same value (inside and outside the dataset) and there is
an unobserved good whose price is fixed.
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4 Welfare
To study welfare, we must take a stand on the interpretation of approximation error.
For this section, we follow Allen and Rehbeck [2020] and treat the approximation error
as arising from satisficing in the spirit of Simon [1947]. In particular, an individual
has a utility function that describes the ranking over goods, but satisfices by choosing
bundles that are “good enough.”
We now discuss how satisficing relates to the measurement and prediction wedge.
When trying to learn about utility from data, a measurement wedge arises since
observed choices may not be optimal. When trying to predict welfare for a price
change, the prediction wedge occurs since we only know the region of bundles that
are “good enough.” Assumption 11 means that the measurement and prediction wedge
are the same size as the smallest amount of satisficing needed to describe the data. We
note that one can also apply the satisficing interpretation to counterfactual quantities,
but it is not necessary. For this reason we did not distinguish between these wedges
in Section 3. Appendix B provides additional discussion.
Since we are studying quasilinear utility there are two natural welfare objects. We look
at differences in utility over consumption bundles and differences in (approximate)
indirect utility over prices. An important asymmetry arises because learning about
differences in utility only involves the measurement wedge because it does not involve
choices in new situations. In contrast, differences in (approximate) indirect utility
over prices involves both the measurement wedge and prediction wedge because one
must consider choices in new settings. We elaborate more below.
4.1 Recoverability of Utility
Our first goal is to learn about the unknown utility function over consumption bundles
using data. This is helpful when considering policies involving the direct distribution
of goods.
In general, there is a collection utility functions that can ε-rationalize a dataset
tpxt, ptquTt“1. We study bounds on utility differences between consumption bundles.
Specifically, given two consumption bundles x˜1, x˜0 P RK` we consider the upper and
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lower bounds
upx˜1, x˜0, εq “ sup
tu|u ε´rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
 
upx˜1q ´ upx˜0q(
upx˜1, x˜0, εq “ inftu|u ε´rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
 
upx˜1q ´ upx˜0q( .
Here, we consider all possible utility functions u : RK` Ñ R without additional restric-
tions such as monotonicity or concavity. A utility function u is said to ε-rationalize
the dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1 when for every t P t1, . . . , T u the inequality
upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ě upxq ´ p ¨ x´ ε
holds for every x P RK` .
To interpret these bounds, suppose for example that upx˜1, x˜0, εq ă 0. We conclude
that the individual ranks x˜0 above x˜1, even when the individual’s choices do not ex-
actly maximize utility. Thus, there is no ambiguity in the ranking of these bundles
according to the unknown utility function u. If upx˜1, x˜0, εq ą 0, then it is possible that
the individual ranks x˜1 above x˜0. Lastly, if upx˜1, x˜0, εq ą 0, then we conclude the in-
dividual ranks x˜1 above x˜0. More broadly, these bounds provide cardinal information
on utility differences, in units of the price of the numeraire.
To gain some intuition how bounds on differences of utility are informed by data,
consider two bundles xr and xs in the dataset. Since xr is approximately optimal
given prices pr, we have the restriction
upxrq ´ pr ¨ xr ě upxsq ´ pr ¨ xs ´ ε,
which rearranges to
upxsq ´ upxrq ď pr ¨ pxs ´ xrq ` ε. (4)
Differences in utility are thus bounded by changes in expenditure. Here, price is
fixed and a change in quantity determines the magnitude of the expenditure change.
The inequality in (4) arises because the point in the data xr was approximately
optimal at prices pr. Thus, ε here directly involves the observed data and is part of
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the measurement wedge. There is no prediction wedge because an analyst does not
contemplate choices in new situations.
We first formalize computation of the bounds before providing additional interpre-
tation. We show the bounds can be calculated as a linear program. An explicit
description is relegated to Proposition A.2 in Appendix A.
Proposition 7. For a dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1, let ε ě ε˚. If x˜0 is in the dataset, i.e.
x˜0 “ xS for some S P t1, . . . , T u, then upx˜1, x˜0, εq is finite and can be calculated as
a linear program. If x˜1 is in the dataset, i.e. x˜1 “ xF for some F P t1, . . . , T u, then
upx˜1, x˜0, εq is finite and can be calculated as a linear program.
Under Assumption 11 (ε “ ε˚), these bounds cannot be improved.
Note that the set  
u | u ε´ rationalizes tpxt, ptquTt“1
(
is convex in the sense that if each ua, ub ε-rationalize the dataset, then αua`p1´αqub
does for α P r0, 1s. This follows from inspecting inequalities such as
upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ě upxq ´ p ¨ x´ ε
that define ε-rationalizability by a utility function u. This means that any value
between upx˜1, x˜0, εq and upx˜1, x˜0, εq can be attained.
To gain further intuition how data bound utility differences, we provide an analytical
characterization. This characterization builds on inequalities such as (4) above, yet
uses longer sequences (rather than just pairs) of observations to describe the tightest
possible bounds. This parallels analysis of counterfactuals, where restrictions other
than the law of demand arise by considering sequences of observations.
Proposition 8. For a dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1, let ε ě ε˚. If x˜0 is in the dataset, i.e.
x˜0 “ xS for some S P t1, . . . , T u, then for any x˜1 P RK` with x˜1 ‰ xS, the upper bound
on utility differences is given by
upx˜1, xS, εq “ min
σPΣS
#
pσpMq ¨ px˜1 ´ xσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
pσpmq ¨ pxσpm`1q ´ xσpmqq `Mε
+
,
where ΣS is the set of sequences that start with σp1q “ S, have no cycles, and have
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length at least M ě 1. Moreover, the function u is strictly increasing and continuous
in px˜1, εq over the region that satisfies ε ě ε˚ and excludes x˜1 “ xS.
The sums inside the minimum are closely related to sums discussed in Proposition 3 for
counterfactuals. The sums differ because Proposition 3 constructs sequences making
a cycle (to remove the unknown utility numbers). In contrast, Proposition 8 considers
sequences that do not make a cycle because the goal is to examine differences of utility
numbers.
Continuity and concavity fail at x˜1 “ xS (when ε ą 0) because the difference in utility
is zero when the quantity is the same. Since upx˜0, x˜1, εq “ ´upx˜1, x˜0, εq, analogous
results hold for the lower bound upxF , x˜1, εq if the first argument xF is in the dataset.
See Proposition A.2 for formal results.
An important feature for practical application is that the bounds on utilities are
trivial unless an appropriate quantity is in the dataset. We formalize this as follows.
Proposition 9. For a dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1, let ε ě ε˚. If x˜0 is not in the dataset, i.e.
x˜0 ‰ xr for every r P t1, . . . , T u, then
upx˜1, x˜0, εq “ 8.
If x˜1 is not in the dataset, then
upx˜1, x˜0, εq “ ´8.
Recall that Proposition 8 shows that u is strictly increasing and continuous over a
region. Thus, the upper bound on utility differences has some shape restrictions like a
“nice” utility function. Despite this, the bound is not concave/continuous in the first
argument at x˜1 “ xS (when ε ą 0). This means that imposing concavity/continuity
can potentially tighten the bounds.17 Imposing these (or other) shape restrictions is
important if one wishes to bound utility when neither quantity is in the dataset, since
from Proposition 9 we know the bounds are trivial without more structure.
17Continuity and concavity do not tighten the bounds when ε “ 0 because the upper bound u is
then continuous and concave for all values of x˜1. See the proof of Proposition A.2 for more details.
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4.2 Recoverability of Approximate Indirect Utility
We now turn to welfare analysis concerning price changes. Here both the measurement
and prediction wedge play a role. Recall that a “measurement wedge” shows up for
bounds on the utility over bundles as in Section 4.1 since observations may not exactly
maximize a quasilinear utility function. Here the prediction wedge also arises when
ε˚ ą 0 because even when we know the utility function, we do not know which
approximately-optimal choice would be made at a new price.
We first discuss the indirect utility, which is the standard welfare object for the exact
quasilinear model. Later we introduce the approximate indirect utility to account for
the fact that an individual does not exactly optimize. The indirect utility function
associated with the utility function u : RK` Ñ R is given by
Vuppq “ sup
xPRK`
upxq ´ x ¨ p.
Since the researcher does not know the individual’s utility a priori, we consider indi-
rect utility associated with candidate utility functions.
We show how indirect utility interacts with the measurement wedge. If xt is within
ε of the maximum utility possible at price pt, then we can write
Vupptq ď upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ` ε.
The definition of the indirect utility yields for arbitrary p P RK``, the inequality
Vuppq ě upxtq ´ p ¨ xt.
Differencing these, we obtain
Vupptq ´ Vuppq ď xt ¨ pp´ ptq ` ε. (5)
Here, ε arises because the observed choices need not be exact maximizers and thus
is part of the measurement wedge. With a restriction on the magnitude of ε, we can
use observations of xt and pt to bound differences in indirect utility.
We now introduce the prediction wedge. This wedge arises because raw differences
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in indirect utility are not the natural welfare object in our setting for a price change
because we focus on ex ante policy evaluation. Instead, we take into account that
when ε ą 0, an individual may choose bundles with different utility when facing the
same prices. This is because we assume an individual satisfices.
The utility the individual attains for a given price and choice of consumption bundle
is the approximate indirect utility. For observation t P t1, . . . , T u, the approximate
indirect utility is
upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt.
At price p, the approximate indirect utility is restricted to be somewhere in the
interval
rVuppq ´ ε, Vuppqs.
In fact, (weakly) further restrictions take into account that the approximate indirect
utility attained is bounded below by
V u,App, εq “ inf
xPRK`
upxq ´ p ¨ x s.t. upxq ´ p ¨ x ě Vuppq ´ ε,
while the upper bound is the indirect utility. The lower bound on approximate indirect
utility is the lower bound V u,App, εq, while the upper bound on approximate indirect
utility is the upper bound V u,App, εq “ Vuppq.
Now suppose we wish to bound the change in approximate indirect utility between
prices p˜0 and p˜1. If the utility u and level of satisficing ε were known, then the welfare
bounds would be
rV u,App˜1, εq ´ V u,App˜0, εq, V u,App˜1, εq ´ V u,App˜0, εqs.
Fixing u, this interval becomes wider when ε increases. In general, ε controls the
prediction wedge, which arises even if we knew u because we would not know what
is chosen by the satisficer.
Since we do not know the utility function a priori, we consider bounds involving the
smallest and largest changes in approximate indirect utility among all utility functions
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that ε-rationalize the dataset:
V pp˜1, p˜0, εq “ sup
tu|u ε´rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
 
V u,App˜1, εq ´ V u,App˜0, εq
(
V pp˜1, p˜0, εq “ inftu|u ε´rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
 
V u,App˜1, εq ´ V u,App˜0, εq
(
.18
These bounds incorporate both the measurement and prediction wedges. The mea-
surement wedge shows up when considering u that ε-rationalize the data, while the
prediction wedge arises when defining the approximate indirect utility. We use the
same value ε for both since we maintain Assumption 11.
These bounds can inform a researcher about changes in welfare even in the presence
of satisficing. If V pp˜1, p˜0, εq ą 0, then we can conclude that given a price change
from p˜0 to p˜1 the individual is better off at p˜1. If V pp˜1, p˜0, εq ă 0, then the price
change from p˜0 to p˜1 makes the individual worse off. In contrast, ambiguity arises
when V pp˜1, p˜0, εq ă 0 and V pp˜1, p˜0, εq ą 0. In this case an individual may be better
or worse given the price change, but the data alone are inconclusive.
We now state a computational result for the bounds. A specific description of the
linear program is given in Proposition A.3 in Appendix A.
Proposition 10. For a dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1, let ε ě ε˚. The bounds on approximate
indirect utility V pp˜1, p˜0, εq and V pp˜1, p˜0, εq can each be computed as a linear program
whenever they are finite.
Under Assumption 11 pε “ ε˚q, these bounds cannot be improved.
When ε “ ε˚ “ 0, the approximate indirect utility equals the indirect utility, and
these are the sharp bounds on consumer surplus with limited price variation. When
we set ε “ ε˚, these are the adaptive consumer surplus bounds. These bounds may
be used for arbitrary prices p˜1, p˜0, not only at prices in tpptquTt“1. In particular, these
bounds provide welfare bounds at new prices without needing to first provide bounds
on the quantities at the prices.
18Formally, we take the supremum over u such that V u,App˜0, εq is not 8, and the infimum over
u such that V u,App˜1, εq is not 8.
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Recall (5) established for pt in the dataset,
Vupptq ´ Vuppq ď xt ¨ pp´ ptq ` ε.
This states that differences in indirect utility are bounded by changes in expenditure.
Here, the change in expenditure involves keeping the quantity fixed and changing
prices. We present lower and upper bounds on V that build on this inequality. To
state the result, first suppose p˜1 “ pS is in the dataset. Define
hpp˜0q “ min
σPΣS
#
xσpMq ¨ pp˜0 ´ pσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
xσpmq ¨ ppσpm`1q ´ pσpmqq `Mε
+
,
where ΣS is the set of sequences that start with σp1q “ S, have no cycles, and have
length at least M ě 1.
Proposition 11. For a dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1, let ε ě ε˚. If p˜1 is in the dataset, i.e.
p˜1 “ pS for some S P t1, . . . , T u, then for p˜1 ‰ p˜0,
hpp˜0q ´ ε ď V pp˜1, p˜0, εq ď hpp˜0q ` ε,
and for p˜1 “ p˜0, V pp˜1, p˜0, εq “ ε.
This result is established by leveraging duality results we present in Appendix C.3.
Analogous results exist for V because V pp˜1, p˜0, εq “ ´V pp˜0, p˜1, εq, and are omitted
for brevity.
We reiterate that Proposition 10 describes that V can be computed exactly as a linear
program. The goal of Proposition 11 is to make this process less of a “black box.”
Note that when ε “ 0, the lower and upper bounds coincide and we characterize
V pp˜1, p˜0, 0q. We recognize h as a function closely related to the construction of the
Riemann integral, since it computes the sum of the area of certain rectangles. We
may view h as a “discrete” analogue of the consumer surplus formula, which states
that differences in indirect utility are the area of a demand function. In fact, this
integration intuition can be formalized in the special case of a single good pK “ 1q,
when ε “ 0.
Proposition 12. Suppose there is a single good (K “ 1), the dataset tpxt, ptuTt“1
is exactly consistent with quasilinear utility (ε˚ “ 0), and we set ε “ 0. If p˜1 ą
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mintp1, . . . , pT , p˜0u, then
V pp˜1, p˜0, 0q “
ż 1
0
x1ptp˜1 ` p1´ tqp˜0, 0qpp˜01 ´ p˜11qdt.
Proposition 12 shows that in a certain case, there is a tight connection between
bounds on quantities and welfare bounds. Further relationships between welfare and
counterfactual quantities are left for future work.
To close this section, we present shape restrictions on V that hold for all ε ě 0.
Proposition 13. For a dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1, let ε ě ε˚. V pp˜1, p˜0, εq is convex, weakly
decreasing, and lower semicontinuous in p˜1,19 and weakly increasing in ε. If p˜1 P
CCoptptuTt“1q, then V pp˜1, p˜0, εq is finite. If p˜1 R CCoptptuTt“1Y p˜0q, then V pp˜1, p˜0, εq “
8.
The shape restrictions in Proposition 13 are those of an indirect utility function.
We do not obtain global continuity here because the welfare bounds can be infinite.
However, V pp˜1, p˜0, εq is continuous in p˜1 over the relative interior of CCoptptuTt“1q
because it is convex and finite over this set (Rockafellar [2015], Theorem 10.1).
Recall that Proposition 9 shows that bounds on utility differences are trivial when
a quantity is not in the dataset. In contrast, Proposition 13 shows that the bound
on approximate indirect utility V pp˜1, p˜0, εq is typically finite provided p˜1 is not too
low. In particular, neither p˜1 nor p˜0 need be in the dataset. The reason we obtain
these contrasting results is that indirect utility functions must satisfy certain shape
restrictions while we consider utility functions that need not satisfy shape restrictions
such as concavity or monotonicity.
19A function f : H Ñ R Y t8,´8u is lower semicontinuous if for any a P R the set tx P H |
fpxq ď au is closed in the topology on H.
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5 Continuity and Convexity in Quantities and Ap-
proximation Error
In classic revealed preference, a small amount of measurement error can lead to refu-
tation of the model. In this case, there is no way to use the model for counterfactual
or welfare analysis. Below we show continuity of the welfare/counterfactual bounds
in both quantities and degree of approximation error. Thus, we provide a way to
still conduct analysis when the model is not perfect, and do so in a way that is a
continuous enlargement of the standard conceptual framework.20
In more detail, here we study the joint mapping from quantities and approximation
error to the bounds analyzed previously. One motivation for this is that in appli-
cations, an analyst may not observe a dataset of interest tpxt, ptquTt“1 exactly, and
may instead only have an estimate of the quantities. We show below that if we can
consistently estimate quantities, then we can consistently estimate the bounds.
For concreteness, suppose an analyst is conducting a representative agent analysis,
and quantities are mean quantities from a population at a each time period. We
examine the mean demand vector at period t so that xt “ ErX i,ts, where X i,t is
demand for individual i at time t. Here X i,t is treated as a random variable that is
identically distributed across individuals. An analyst estimates {ErX i,ts from a cross-
sectional dataset in which individuals at each time period face the same prices. For
example, the estimator could be the sample average of demands at time t across many
individuals.
We now turn to the formal results. While we allow estimation error associated with
quantities, here we take each price pt as nonrandom and measured exactly. Recall
that xkpp˜, εq is the maximal quantity of good k at counterfactual price p˜ assum-
ing approximation error is no greater than ε. The definition of xk is presented in
Proposition 4. We now treat xk as a function of the dataset of quantities, and with
minor abuse of notation we write xk pd, p˜, εq, where d “
`
d1, . . . , dT
˘ P RKˆT` denotes
quantities across all goods at time periods. This allows us to study how the bound
depends on quantities in the dataset while keeping prices, tptuTt“1, fixed. Similarly,
xk pd, p˜, εq denotes the lower bound. Finally, let A Ď RKˆT` ˆR` denote combinations
20To be clear, results in this paper are also new under ε “ 0 with a few exceptions that are noted.
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of quantities and approximation error such that the counterfactual/welfare objects
are defined, i.e.
A “ tpd, εq P RKˆT` ˆ R` | ε ě ε˚
`tpdt, ptquTt“1˘u.
Proposition 14. Fix a price p˜ where we wish to bound counterfactual quantities and
assume the dataset of prices tptuTt“1 is fixed. The set A is convex. The mapping
xkp¨, p˜, ¨q : AÑ R`Yt8u is concave in pd, εq, and is continuous in pd, εq at any point
where it is finite. The mapping xkp¨, p˜, ¨q : AÑ R` is convex and continuous in pd, εq.
We obtain a similar result for the bounds on approximate indirect utility V and V
when we view them as a function of the dataset of quantities. To formalize this, with
minor abuse of notation let V pd, p˜1, p˜0, εq describe the upper bound as a mapping
of the quantities d P RKˆT` in a dataset. Similarly, V pd, p˜1, p˜0, εq denotes the lower
bound.
Proposition 15. Fix a price pair p˜1 and p˜0 where we wish to bound the difference
in approximate indirect utility, and assume the dataset of prices tptuTt“1 is fixed. The
mapping V p¨, p˜1, p˜0, ¨q : AÑ RY t8u is concave in pd, εq, and is continuous in pd, εq
at any point where it is finite. The mapping V p¨, p˜1, p˜0, ¨q : AÑ RY t´8u is convex
in pd, εq, and is continuous in pd, εq at any point where it is finite.
Recall Proposition 13 shows that when p˜1 P CCoptptuTt“1q, V pd, p˜1, p˜0, εq is finite for
any pd, εq P A.
We need one more result. Here, we interpret the minimal approximation error ε˚ as
a function of quantities for fixed prices tptuTt“1.
Proposition 16 (Allen and Rehbeck [2020]). The mapping ε˚ : RKˆT` Ñ R` is
convex and continuous.
The previous continuity results imply the following consistency results.
Corollary 1. Suppose we have some estimator of the quantities that satisfies dˆn
pÝÑ d.
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Then
xk
´
dˆn, p˜, ε˚
´
dˆn
¯¯
pÝÑ xkpd, p˜, ε˚pdqq
xk
´
dˆn, p˜, ε˚
´
dˆn
¯¯
pÝÑ xkpd, p˜, ε˚pdqq.
V
´
dˆn, p˜1, p˜0, ε˚
´
dˆn
¯¯
pÝÑ V `d, p˜1, p˜0, ε˚ pdq˘
V
´
dˆn, p˜1, p˜0, ε˚
´
dˆn
¯¯
pÝÑ V `d, p˜1, p˜0, ε˚ pdq˘ ,
where each result holds whenever the right hand side result is finite.
This provides a theoretical foundation for plug-in estimation. We omit a formal de-
scription of the sampling scheme since the result applies to any collection of random
variables
!
dˆn
)
that converges in probability to d. For example, if we have panel data
and the quantities pX i,tqTt“1 are independent and identically distributed across indi-
viduals, one can use sample averages so that dˆn “ ` 1
n
řn
i“1X
i,t
˘T
t“1 when estimating
d “ pErX i,tsqTt“1.
Finally, we consider shape restrictions for the bounds on utility differences u and u,
viewed as functions of quantities. As before, fixing prices tptuTt“1, we study dependence
on the quantities d P RKˆT` . With minor abuse of notation write upd, x˜0, x˜1, εq as a
function of quantities and approximation error, and similarly for u.
Recall that Proposition 8 shows that when x˜0 is in the dataset of quantities d,
upd, x˜1, x˜0, εq is finite provided ε ě ε˚. In contrast, Proposition 9 shows that whenever
x˜0 is outside the dataset, upd, x˜1, x˜0, εq “ 8. We conclude that when viewed as a map-
ping of quantities, u is no longer continuous. It is, however, continuous over a certain
subset of A. To describe this, for a vector x˜ P RK` let Apx˜q “ tpd, εq P A | d1 “ x˜u.
This restricts attention to quantities datasets that all contain a certain vector x˜ as
the first component. We formalize continuity and concavity results as follows.
Proposition 17. Fix a quantity pair x˜1 ‰ x˜0 where we wish to bound the difference
in utility, and assume the dataset of prices tptuTt“1 is fixed. The set Apx˜q is convex
for any x˜ P RK` . The mapping up¨, x˜1, x˜0, ¨q : AÑ RYt8u is concave and continuous
in pd, εq over the region Apx˜0q. The mapping up¨, x˜1, x˜0, ¨q : AÑ RY t´8u is convex
and continuous in pd, εq over the region Apx˜1q.
Continuity over all of A does not hold and so one cannot directly apply the continuous
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mapping theorem to establish a consistency result like Corollary 1. If some quantity
vector d1 is measured without error, however, then it is possible to consistently esti-
mate the bounds on utility differences between d1 and other bundles though we omit
details for brevity.
6 Application
We now illustrate the results in the paper with data on the demand for gasoline.
Data are from the 2001 United States National Household Travel Survey, and have
previously been used in Blundell et al. [2012]. The data are from a single cross-
section. For brevity we refer to Blundell et al. [2012] for additional details, including
construction of the particular sample.
The primary observables of interest are quantities and prices. Quantities are annual
gasoline consumption, which is constructed from odometer readings and an estimate
of fuel efficiency. Prices are the average tax-inclusive price per gallon, in the county
where the individual lives.
First note it is possible to map the raw quantities and prices to a dataset tpX i, P iquni“1,
and then apply our previous analysis. Here i denotes the individual and n denotes
the sample size. We use this notation rather than t and T to emphasize we have a
cross-section. We use upper case X i and P i to denote that these are random variables.
We do not use the raw dataset, and instead “pre-process it” to map to our frame-
work. We do so because we have a cross-section of individuals. We wish to both to
diminish the impact of sampling variability as well as incorporate heterogeneity along
observable variables.21 As in, Blundell et al. [2012] we pre-process by first considering
a partially linear model given by
X “ gpP, Y q ` β1W ` U,
where P is price, Y is income, W are observed covariates, and U is unobservable
21Allen and Rehbeck [2020] study how stochastic shocks and approximation error can be stud-
ied in a common framework. That paper provides several aggregation theorems, and discusses a
representative agent in this setting.
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heterogeneity. While Blundell et al. [2012] interpret g as a demand curve for a rep-
resentative agent for the general model of utility maximization subject to a budget
constraint, here we have a different interpretation. We interpret gp¨, Y q as the de-
mand curve for the representative agent with income level Y ; Y thus serves as a
demographic characteristic that alters the shape of the demand curve. We close the
model with the restriction
ErU | P “ p, Y “ y,W “ ws “ 0.
This specification allows price sensitivity to depend on the level of income of an
individual. For each level of income y˜, we consider a dataset (in the sense used
previously in the paper) of the form
Dpy˜q “  gˆpP i, y˜q, P i(n˜
i“1 ,
where gˆ is an estimator of g described below. Thus, gˆpP i, y˜q is akin to the structural
quantity xt in the previous notation, and P i is akin to pt. Like Blundell et al. [2012],
we consider prices between the 5-th and 95-th quantile to mitigate endpoint issues,
so n˜ enumerates these observations.
The estimator gˆ is constructed similar to Blundell et al. [2012]. We first estimate βˆ
by a double residual regression as in Robinson [1988].22 Then we set
gˆpP i, y˜q “
řN
j“1
´
Xj ´ βˆ1Wj
¯
KhppP j ´ P iqKhypY j ´ y˜qřN
j“1KhppP j ´ P iqKhypY j ´ y˜q
,
where Kh is a kernel with bandwith h. Following Blundell et al. [2012] we use the
biweight kernel. Throughout, the bandwidths hp and hy are chosen so that
hp
hy
“ σˆP
σˆY
,
where σˆ2P “ 1n
řn
i“1pP i ´ P q2, P “ 1n
řn
i“1 Pi, σˆ
2
Y “ 1n
řn
i“1pY i ´ Y q2, and Y “
1
n
řn
i“1 Yi. Note that these are all constructed with all observations.
Figure 2 presents analysis with two choices of bandwidths. These correspond to the
22We use the biweight kernel with ad hoc bandwidth .75 after standardizing the data.
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ad hoc choices .75 and 1 after standardizing. The top two panels display the kernel-
smoothed “dataset”
D
`
Y
˘ “  gˆ `P i, Y ˘ , P i(n˜
i“1
as well as counterfactual bounds, where gˆ
`
P i, Y
˘
is interpreted as a quantity for ob-
servation i facing prices P i. Recall n˜ denotes the middle 90% of observations in terms
of price, where we drop the lower and upper 5% to mitigate endpoint issues. Income
is evaluated at the sample mean Y . The welfare bounds for approximate indirect
utility are displayed in the middle panels. The bounds are evaluated relative to the
mean price P “ 1.334. The bounds for differences in utility for certain quantities are
displayed in the lower panels. The utility bounds are relative to the median quan-
tity in the dataset. There are 101 comparisons, which for computational reasons are
made between 101 of the points in the dataset of quantities
 
gˆ
`
P i, Y
˘(n˜
i“1. Recall
from Proposition 9, comparisons in utility when one quantity is not in the dataset
will have at least one trivial bound. This is why we restrict attention to comparisons
in which both quantities are in the dataset. It is important to note that in practice,
simply bounding quantities over a grid will lead to trivial bounds for many points in
the grid.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 2: Quantity, Approximate Indirect Utility, and Utility Bounds at Two Band-
widths
Notes: The top panels depict quantity bounds at new prices. The middle panels depict
bounds on approximate indirect utility relative to the mean price. The lower panels depict
bounds on utility at certain quantities, relative to the median quantity in the dataset.
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As can be seen from the figures, the choice of bandwidth noticeably alters the infor-
mativeness of the counterfactual bounds (upper panels). In contrast, the bounds on
approximate indirect utility (middle panels) and utility (lower panels) are relatively
narrow for both bandwidths. Similar results obtain for alternative bandwidths and
are available upon request.
In the lower panels, a contrast emerges between the lower and upper bounds on utility.
Recall that these bounds are for upx˜1q´upx˜0q, where x˜0 is the median quantity, i.e. in
the dataset. Because the second argument is in the dataset, Proposition 8 applies to
the upper bounds and establishes monotonicity in the argument x˜1. The graphs are
consistent with this, since the upper bounds are monotone in quantities. In contrast,
the lower bounds are not monotone. In order to make lower bounds on utilities
monotone, it would be necessary to have the first argument be in the dataset and
fixed (x˜1). See Proposition A.2(vi) in Appendix A.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a conceptual framework for counterfactual and welfare analysis
for approximate models. Our main conceptual assumption is that model approxima-
tion error has the same magnitude in new settings as the data we have seen. We
formalize this for the quasilinear utility model. This assumption is portable to other
settings, and generalizes the standard approach that requires correct specification in
both the data we have seen and at hypothetical values.
Engaging with the possibility that a model may not perfectly match data is especially
important using the nonparametric revealed preference approach. Indeed, a natural
intuition is that if approximation error is “small,” then it is second order and we can
ignore it for certain questions. Unfortunately, this intuition is false in the standard
approach used in the revealed preference literature, since small violations of the model
mean it cannot be used for counterfactual or welfare analysis. This paper presents
an adaptive approach allowing the analyst to use the model formally viewing it as an
approximation. Moreover, our counterfactual/welfare bounds are continuous in the
degree of approximation error, and so they continuously transition to the standard
framework when approximation error is negligible.
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Appendix A Proofs of Main Results
This appendix provides proofs of the results in the main text. It also provides explicit
descriptions of the linear programs mentioned in the main text. Some of the proofs
require additional lemmas contained in Supplemental Appendix C.
A.1 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Facts 1-4. The proofs are in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 2. Emptiness of Xpp˜, D, εq when ε ă ε˚ is immediate from
Fact 3. It remains to show that when ε ě ε˚, the set Xpp˜, D, εq is nonempty.
First, fix px1, p1q P tpxt, ptquTt“1 and let Σ1 denote the set of finite sequences of t P
t1, . . . , T u with no cycles that begins at px1, p1q. Define
Upxq “ min
σPΣ1
#
pσpMq ¨ `x´ xσpMq˘` M´1ÿ
m“1
pσpmq ¨ pxσpm`1q ´ xσpmqq `Mε
+
,
where σ P Σ1 is a sequence of length M , for all m P t1, . . . ,Mu it follows that
σpmq P t1, . . . , T u, and σp1q “ 1. Allen and Rehbeck [2020] have shown that for
ε ě ε˚, this function ε-rationalizes the data in the sense that for each t P t1, . . . , T u
and each x P RK` ,
Upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ě Upxq ´ pt ¨ x´ ε.
The function Upxq need not induce an ε-maximizer when prices take low values.
However, the constructed utility can be modified to guarantee maximizers exist.
To that end, let
U “ sup
xPCoptxtuTt“1q
Upxq
where CoptxtuTt“1q denotes the convex hull, i.e. the smallest convex set containing
txtuTt“1. We see U ă 8 since U is continuous and CoptxtuTt“1q is compact. Define
f : RK` Ñ R by fpxq “
řK
k“1 xk
1`řKk“1 xk ` U , which is bounded and concave. To see this,
note the function h : R` Ñ R given by hpzq “ z{p1 ` zq is concave by inspecting
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derivatives. Since f is a composition of a concave function and an affine and strictly
increasing function it is concave.
Now construct U˜pxq “ mintUpxq, fpxqu. This function rationalizes the data since for
t P t1, . . . , T u and x P RK` we have
U˜pxtq ´ pt ¨ xt “ Upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ě Upxq ´ pt ¨ x´ ε ě U˜pxq ´ pt ¨ x´ ε.
In addition, U˜ is concave since it is the minimum of concave functions. Similarly, U˜ is
continuous and strictly increasing as it is the minimum of finitely many continuous and
strictly increasing functions. It remains to show this utility admits an ε-maximizer
for all prices p P R``.
To that end, note the indirect utility of f , denoted
Vf ppq “ sup
xPRK`
fpxq ´ p ¨ x,
is everywhere finite over the region p P RK`` because f is bounded between U and
U ` 1. Moreover, since U˜ ď f pointwise, we also have VU˜ppq ď Vf ppq, so that VU˜ is
finite for any p P RK``. Since RK`` is open, from Lemma C.2 we conclude that
U˜pxq ´ p ¨ x
admits an exact maximizer in x for any p P RK``. In particular, it admits ε-
maximizers, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. An equivalent definition of Xpp˜, D, εq is x˜ P Xpp˜, D, εq if and
only if the augmented dataset DYpx˜, p˜q is ε-rationalized by quasilinear utility. From
the characterization in Lemma C.1(iii), this is equivalent to showing that certain
sequences satisfy an inequality. For each sequence involving the augmented dataset
there are two cases. If the sequence does not contain px˜, p˜q, then the inequality
in Lemma C.1(iii) is satisfied because we assume ε ě ε˚pDq. (Note that ε˚pDq is
constructed to have this property.) It remains to check sequences involving px˜, p˜q.
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Rearranging the inequality of Lemma C.1(iii), we see that
pp˜´ ptM q ¨ x˜ ď pM ` 1qε` p˜ ¨ xt1 ´ ptM ¨ xtM ´
M´1ÿ
m“1
ptm ¨ pxtm ´ xtm`1q (6)
must hold for all finite sequences ttmuMm“1 without cycles where tm P t1, . . . , T u and
M ě 1. Here we have the M`1 coefficient on ε since the sequences include the coun-
terfactual observation and a length M sequence. This characterizes the set Xpp˜, D, εq
as an intersection of finitely many half-spaces. Thus, Xpp˜, D, εq is a closed, convex
polyhedron.
To prove Proposition 4, we prove a stronger result that explicitly describes the linear
program.
Proposition A.1. For a dataset D “ tpxt, ptquTt“1, let ε ě ε˚. Then whenever
Xkpp˜, D, εq is bounded above, its maximum is given by the linear program
xkpp˜, εq “ max
x˜PRK`
u1,...,uT ,u˜PR`
x˜k
s.t. us ď ur ` pr ¨ pxs ´ xrq ` ε for all r, s P t1, . . . , T u
u˜ ď ur ` pr ¨ px˜´ xrq ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
ur ď u˜` p˜ ¨ pxr ´ x˜q ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u.
The upper bound xkpp˜, εq may be equivalently calculated as
xkpp˜, εq “ max
x˜PRK`
x˜k
s.t. pp˜´ ptM q ¨ x˜ ď pM ` 1qε` p˜ ¨ xt1 ´ ptM ¨ xtM ´
M´1ÿ
m“1
ptm ¨ pxtm ´ xtm`1q,
where this inequality must hold for all finite sequences ttmuMm“1 with tm P t1, . . . , T u
and M ě 1. The value of xkpp˜, εq is calculated as the minimum of the objective
with either constraint set of the above linear programs. The value xkpp˜, εq is weakly
increasing in ε over the region ε ě ε˚, and xkpp˜, εq is weakly decreasing in ε over the
region ε ě ε˚.
The first linear program is easy to implement as it has order pT ` 1q2 constraints
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and T ` 1 ` K unknowns. The second linear program is useful to understand the
mapping from data to bounds. However, directly operationalizing the second linear
program would require enumerating all finite sequences of the dataset that do not
contain cycles, which is computationally costly.
Related bounds have appeared in Chiong et al. [2017] and Allen and Rehbeck [2019a],
which focus on latent utility models with observable characteristics of goods other
than prices. The result here differs since ε can be nonzero and the first set of bounds
directly describes a convenient linear program used to compute bounds.23 We take
xk to be positive infinity when there is no finite upper bound.
Proof of Proposition A.1 (and Proposition 4). The linear programming formulations
are immediate from Lemma C.1 and the proof of Proposition 3. From Lemma C.3,
the maximum is attained because the linear program has a bounded value function by
construction. Recall that for the second formulation, we only need to consider cycles
involving the counterfactual quantity-price tuple because we have assumed ε ě ε˚.
Recall that all cycles that do not involve the counterfactual quantity are necessarily
less than ε˚ and will not bind. We leveraged these properties in Proposition 3 already.
The proof for xk are analogous and are omitted.
Now we argue that these bounds cannot be improved under Assumption 11. To see
this, note from Proposition 5 that the bounds are weakly monotone in ε. Moreover,
when ε ă ε˚ we know the set Xpp˜, D, εq (and hence Xkpp˜, D, εq) is empty from
Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 5. We begin by showing that xkpp˜, εq is finite if and only if
p˜ P intCCoptptuTt“1q. First, let p˜ P intCCoptptuTt“1q so that p˜ ą
řT
t“1 αtp
t for some
nonnegative αt such that
řT
t αt “ 1. Note that for each t P t1, . . . T u, the approximate
law of demand yields
pp˜´ ptq ¨ px˜´ xtq ď 2ε.
23Chiong et al. [2017] essentially start with the second formulation of the bounds (in terms of
cycles) and show that while there are many cycles, only a certain number are effectively binding.
The first formulation of Proposition A.1 complements their analysis by describing an explicit linear
program with order pT ` 1q2 scalar inequalities. Allen and Rehbeck [2019a] describe bounds in
certain models with characteristics in place of prices, and use a characterization similar to the cycles
condition, but do not study extreme points or describe computations.
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Multiplying by αt and summing up the inequalities gives that˜
p˜´
Tÿ
t“1
αtp
t
¸
¨
˜
x˜´
Lÿ
t“1
αtx
t
¸
ď 2ε.
Thus, ˜
p˜´
Tÿ
t“1
αtp
t
¸
¨ x˜ ď 2ε`
˜
p˜´
Tÿ
t“1
αtp
t
¸
¨
Lÿ
t“1
`
αtx
t
˘
.
Since
´
p˜´řTt“1 αtpt¯ ą 0 and x˜ P RK` one can bound the values on each dimension
of x˜ so that
x˜ P
Kź
k“1
»–0, 2ε`
´
p˜´řTt“1 αtpt¯ ¨řLt“1 αtxtq
p˜k ´řTt“1 αtptk
fifl .
This shows that xkpp˜, εq is finite when p˜ P intCCoptptuTt“1q.
Next, we show when p˜ R intCCoptptuTt“1q that xkpp˜, εq is unbounded. Suppose that
p˜ R intCCoptptuTt“1q. This means for all t P t1, . . . , T u that p˜ ď pt. From Proposition 3
we know x˜ P Xpp˜, D, εq if and only if for any sequence ttmuMm“1 with M ě 1,
pp˜´ ptM q ¨ px˜´ xt1q ď pM ` 1qε` ptM ¨ xt1 ´ ptM ¨ xtM ´
M´1ÿ
m“1
ptm ¨ pxtm ´ xtm`1q.
Note that the right hand side of the expression is always weakly positive. Moreover,
p˜ ´ ptM ď 0 for every dimension. If all terms are zero, this places no restrictions on
x˜ so that one can choose arbitrarily positive amounts of every good. If there is a
dimension k such that p˜k ´ ptMk ă 0, then one can choose arbitrarily high amounts of
x˜k to satisfy all such inequalities. This establishes that xkpp˜, εq is unbounded above.
Note that the lower bound xkpp˜, εq is always finite because it is bounded below by 0.
To show monotonicity in ε note that the feasibility region is weakly increasing (with
regard to set inclusion) as ε increases. Thus, xk is weakly increasing in ε, and xk is
weakly decreasing in ε.
Proof of Proposition 6. First, let Σ be the set of sequences ttmuMm“1 that contain no
cycles where tm P t1, . . . , T u. From Proposition 3, the counterfactual bounds on
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demand are given by inequalities of the form
pp˜´ ptM qx˜ ď pM ` 1qε` p˜xt1 ´ ptMxtM ´
M´1ÿ
m“1
ptmpxtm ´ xtm`1q, (7)
which much hold for every sequence in Σ. Dot products are removed since all objects
are one-dimensional.
Whether a certain inequality of the form (7) provides an upper bound or lower bound
on x˜ depends on the sign of p˜ ´ ptM . To see this, note that rearranging Equation 7
when p˜ ą ptM yields
x˜ ď pM ` 1qε` p˜x
t1 ´ ptMxtM ´řM´1m“1 ptmpxtm ´ xtm`1q
p˜´ ptM
“ xt1 ` pM ` 1qε` p
tMxt1 ´ ptMxtM ´řM´1m“1 ptmpxtm ´ xtm`1q
p˜´ ptM . (8)
Note the the expression in Equation 8 that is divided by p˜´ ptm is positive since the
terms above are those for a cycle of length M . To see this, note that
ptM pxtM ´ xt1q `
M´1ÿ
m“1
ptmpxtm ´ xtm`1q ďMε ď pM ` 1qε,
where the first inequality holds because ε ě ε˚ and the left hand side is a sequence
of length M . Thus, such sequences constitute upper bounds.
When instead p˜ ă ptM , the sequence yields a lower bound since one is dividing by
a negative number. Since the sign of the difference matters, we partition the set of
sequences in Σ as follows. We consider the counterfactual prices where p˜0 ă p˜1 without
loss of generality. Let ttmuMm“1 “ σ P Σ1 when ptM ď p˜0 ă p˜1. Let ttmuMm“1 “ σ P Σ0
when p˜0 ă ptM ă p˜1. Lastly, let ttmuMm“1 “ σ P Σ´1 when p˜0 ă p˜1 ď ptM .
Upper bounds on counterfactual demand for the price p˜0 involve sequences where
ptM ď p˜0 (i.e. sequences in Σ1). Upper bounds on counterfactual demand for the
price p˜1 involve sequences where ptM ď p˜1 (i.e. sequences in Σ1YΣ0). We denote the
upper bound inequalities by
UBpp˜0q “ tx˜ P R` | Equation 7 holds for sequences σ P Σ1 with p˜ “ p˜0u
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and
UBpp˜1q “ tx˜ P R` | Equation 7 holds for sequences σ P Σ1 Y Σ0 with p˜ “ p˜1u.
We use Equation (8) to show that UBpp˜1q Ď UBpp˜0q. First, if x˜ P UBpp˜1q then for
every sequence ttmuMm“1 “ σ P Σ1 with ptM ă p˜0 ă p˜1 it follows that
x˜ ď xt1 ` pM ` 1qε` p
tMxt1 ´ ptMxtM ´řM´1m“1 ptmpxtm ´ xtm`1q
p˜1 ´ ptM
ď xt1 ` pM ` 1qε` p
tMxt1 ´ ptMxtM ´řM´1m“1 ptmpxtm ´ xtm`1q
p˜0 ´ ptM
where the second inequality holds since the numerator is positive and 0 ă p˜0´ ptM ă
p˜1 ´ ptM . If p˜0 “ ptM for a sequence σ P Σ1, then there is no restriction on the
counterfactual demands. Since UBpp˜0q only is restricted by sequences in Σ1 while
UBpp˜1q is restricted by sequences in Σ1 and Σ0, this shows UBpp˜1q Ď UBpp˜0q. This
proves that x¯pp˜1, εq ď x¯pp˜0, εq since x¯ is the maximum, the upper bounds satisfy
UBpp˜1q Ď UBpp˜0q, and a maximum over a larger set is weakly larger.
Next note that the lower bounds on counterfactual demand x˜ are given by the fol-
lowing
LBpp˜0q “ tx˜ P R` | Equation 7 holds for sequences σ P Σ´1 Y Σ0 with p˜ “ p˜0u
and
LBpp˜1q “ tx˜ P R` | Equation 7 holds for sequences σ P Σ´1 with p˜ “ p˜1u.
To see this, note that rearranging Equation 7 when p˜ ă ptM yields
x˜ ě xt1 ´ pM ` 1qε` p
tMxt1 ´ ptMxtM ´řM´1m“1 ptmpxtm ´ xtm`1q
ptM ´ p˜ .
We now show that LBpp˜0q Ď LBpp˜1q. If x˜ P LBpp˜0q, then for every sequence
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ttmuMm“1 “ σ P Σ´1 with p˜0 ă p˜1 ă ptM it follows that
x˜ ě xt1 ´ pM ` 1qε` p
tMxt1 ´ ptMxtM ´řM´1m“1 ptmpxtm ´ xtm`1q
ptM ´ p˜0
ě xt1 ´ pM ` 1qε` p
tMxt1 ´ ptMxtM ´řM´1m“1 ptmpxtm ´ xtm`1q
ptM ´ p˜1
since the term being subtracted weakly increases when dividing by a smaller difference
since 0 ă ptM ´ p˜0 ă ptM ´ p˜1. (Recall the numerator in each fraction is positive.)
When the sequence σ P Σ´1 has p˜1 “ ptM there is no restriction on counterfactual
demands. Since LBpp˜1q only is restricted from sequences in Σ´1 while LBpp˜0q is
restricted by sequences in Σ´1 and Σ0, this shows LBpp˜0q Ď LBpp˜1q. This also shows
that xpp˜1, εq ď xpp˜0, εq since x is a minimum, the constraint set on the lower bounds
LBpp˜0q Ď LBpp˜1q, and a minimum over a smaller set is weakly larger.
A.2 Proofs for Section 4
A.2.1 Proofs for Section 4.1
Propositions 7 and 8 are proven together in the following result.
Proposition A.2. For a dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1, let ε ě ε˚.
i. If x˜0 is in the dataset, i.e. x˜0 “ xS for some S P t1, . . . , T u, and x˜1 ‰ x˜0, then
upx˜1, x˜0, εq “ max
u1,...,uT ,u˜1PR`
u˜1 ´ uS
s.t. us ď ur ` pr ¨ pxs ´ xrq ` ε for all r, s P t1, . . . , T u
u˜1 ď ur ` pr ¨ px˜1 ´ xrq ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
u˜1 “ ur for all r P t1, . . . , T u with x˜1 “ xr.
ii. If x˜0 “ xS is in the dataset and x˜1 ‰ x˜0, then the upper bound is equivalently
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given by
upx˜1, x˜0, εq “ min
σPΣS
#
pσpMq ¨ px˜1 ´ xσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
pσpmq ¨ pxσpm`1q ´ xσpmqq `Mε
+
,
where ΣS is the set of sequences that start with σp1q “ S, have no cycles, and
have length at least M ě 1.
iii. If x˜0 “ xS is in the dataset, the function u is strictly increasing and continuous in
px˜1, εq over the region that excludes x˜1 “ x˜0. In particular, under Assumption 1
the bound cannot be improved.
iv. If x˜1 is in the dataset, i.e. x˜1 “ xF for some F P t1, . . . , T u, and x˜1 ‰ x˜0, then
upx˜1, x˜0, εq “ min
u1,...,uT ,u˜0PR`
uF ´ u˜0
s.t. us ď ur ` pr ¨ pxs ´ xrq ` ε for all r, s P t1, . . . , T u
u˜0 ď ur ` pr ¨ px˜0 ´ xrq ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
u˜0 “ ur for all r P t1, . . . , T u with x˜0 “ xr.
v. If x˜1 “ xF is in the dataset and x˜1 ‰ x˜0, then the lower bound is equivalently
given by
upx˜1, x˜0, εq “ max
σPΣF
#
pσpMq ¨ pxσpMq ´ x˜0q `
M´1ÿ
m“1
pσpmq ¨ pxσpmq ´ xσpm`1qq ´Mε
+
.
vi. If x˜1 “ xF is in the dataset, the function u is strictly decreasing and continuous in
px˜0, εq over the region that excludes x˜0 “ x˜1. In particular, under Assumption 1
the bound cannot be improved.
Parts (i) and (iv) describe the linear programs used for computation and stated as
Proposition 7 in the main text. Note that parts (ii) and (v) show that the bounds
are finite, as claimed in Proposition 7. The other parts cover Proposition 8 stated in
the main text. Parts (ii) and (v) provide analytical characterizations of the bounds
on utility differences. Parts (iii) and (vi) describe shape restrictions of the bounds.
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Proof of Proposition A.2. We first prove parts (i) and (ii).
The definition of ε-rationalizability yields
upx˜1, xS, εq ď sup
u1,...,uT ,u˜1PR`
u˜1 ´ uS
s.t. us ď ur ` pr ¨ pxs ´ xrq ` ε for all r, s P t1, . . . , T u
u˜1 ď ur ` pr ¨ px˜1 ´ xrq ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
u˜1 “ ur for all r P t1, . . . , T u with x˜1 “ xr.
We shall show the opposite inequality holds to prove (i), and in doing so characterize
the maximum as stated in part (ii). First, note that the problem on the right hand
side is feasible since for the dataset D “ tpxt, ptquTt“1, we assumed ε ě ε˚pDq. We
show that there is a utility function u˜ such that for any u1, . . . , uT , u˜1 P R` that are
feasible,
u˜1 ´ uS ď u˜px˜1q ´ u˜pxSq.
To that end, first consider feasible values u1, . . . , uT , u˜1. For any sequence that begins
at σp1q “ S, we can sum up the inequalities in the program to obtain
u˜1 ´ uS ď pσpMq ¨ px˜1 ´ xσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
pσpmq ¨ pxσpm`1q ´ xσpmqq `Mε.
Thus,
u˜1 ´ uS ď min
σPΣS
#
pσpMq ¨ px˜1 ´ xσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
pσpmq ¨ pxσpm`1q ´ xσpmqq `Mε
+
,
where ΣS is the set of sequences with σp1q “ S, have no cycles, and have length at
least M ě 1. We show in particular that provided x˜1 ‰ xS, the upper bound on the
right hand side can be attained by the utility function u˜, defined for x ‰ xS by
u˜pxq “ min
σPΣS
#
pσpMq ¨ px´ xσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
pσpmq ¨ pxσpm`1q ´ xσpmqq `Mε
+
,
and defined for xS by u˜pxSq “ 0. Note that the summation on the right side defining
u˜pxq is zero whenever M “ 1 because it is a summation over an empty set of indices.
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Note that u˜ is not continuous at xS, which is key for our arguments.
We show that this utility function rationalizes the data. For any x P RK` , it follows
that for any t P t1, . . . , T u such that xt ‰ xS,
u˜pxq ´ pt ¨ x ď pt ¨ px´ xtq ` pσ˚,tpM˚,tq ¨ pxt ´ xσ˚,tpM˚,tqq`
M˚,t´1ÿ
m“1
pσ
˚,tpmq ¨ pxσ˚,tpm`1q ´ xσ˚,tpmqq ` pM˚,t ` 1qε´ pt ¨ x
“ pσ˚,tpM˚,tq ¨ pxt ´ xσ˚,tpM˚,tqq`
M˚,t´1ÿ
m“1
pσ
˚,tpmq ¨ pxσ˚,tpm`1q ´ xσ˚,tpmqq ` pM˚,t ` 1qε´ pt ¨ xt
“ u˜pxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ` ε
where σ˚,t P ΣS is a sequence that obtains the minimum of u˜pxtq and M˚,t is the
length of that sequence.
Lastly, consider the observation S P t1, . . . , T u. For any x P RK` , it follows that
u˜pxq ´ pS ¨ x ď pS ¨ px´ xSq ` ε´ pS ¨ x
“ u˜pxSq ´ pS ¨ xS ` ε
where the inequality follows by looking at the sequence length one which only has
observation S and the equality follows since u˜pxSq “ 0.
This utility function gives
u˜px˜1q ´ u˜pxSq “ min
σPΣS
#
pσpMq ¨ px˜1 ´ xσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
pσpmq ¨ pxσpm`1q ´ xσpmqq `Mε
+
ď upx˜1, xS, εq.
The inequality holds because u˜ ε-rationalizes the dataset. The first part of the proof
of the proposition established upx˜1, xS, εq ď u˜px˜1q ´ u˜pxSq. This proves part (ii).
To prove part (i), note that we can use the function u˜pxq to generate utility num-
bers that satisfy the inequality and equality conditions in the linear programming
formulation. Indeed, set ut “ u˜pxtq ´ minxPtxsuTs“1Yx˜1tu˜pxqu for t P t1, . . . , T u and
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u˜1 “ u˜px˜1q ´minxPtxsuTs“1Yx˜1tu˜pxqu. We subtract the minimum because u˜pxq can be
negative. Here the values ut and u˜1 are weakly positive and satisfy the inequalities.
To prove (iii), recall that the upper bound is the minimum of finitely many affine
functions as shown in (ii), except at x˜0 “ xS when ε ą 0. Each such function is
strictly increasing and continuous in px˜0, εq. From this we conclude that u is strictly
increasing and continuous in px˜0, εq (except at x˜0 “ xS when ε ą 0). Thus, taking
the minimum over ε subject to the constraint that the bound is defined, we see that
under Assumption 11 the bound cannot be tightened. Note that here we use that for
the special case x˜1 “ x˜0, upx˜1, x˜0, εq “ 0, which is also the tightest possible under
Assumption 11.
The proofs for (iv)-(vi) are analogous since upx˜1, x˜0, εq “ ´upx˜0, x˜1, εq, and are omit-
ted.
Proof of Proposition 9. First suppose x˜0 is not in the dataset. Since ε ě ε˚ there
is some utility function u that ε-rationalizes the dataset. If we modify the utility
function to make upx˜0q arbitrarily negative, the modified function still rationalizes
the dataset. Note that this modified function satisfies local nonsatiation, but is not
(globally) strictly increasing or concave. This proves upx˜0, x˜1, εq “ 8.
Now instead suppose x˜1 is not in the dataset. For any utility function that ε-
rationalizes the dataset, we can modify upx˜1q to be arbitrariliy negative. Such a
modified utility function still rationalizes the dataset, and so upx˜0, x˜1, εq “ ´8.
A.3 Proofs for Section 4.2
We prove a stronger and more formal version of Proposition 10, explicitly describing
a tractable linear program. To state this result, relative to the main text we use
argument p˜T`2 in place of p˜1 and p˜T`1 in place of p˜0. We use this notation because
in the proofs it is helpful to think of these as extra observations relative to a dataset
of T observations.
Proposition A.3. For a dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1, let ε ě ε˚. Whenever V pp˜T`2, p˜T`1, εq
is finite, the change in the approximate indirect utility can be bounded by the following
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linear program:
V pp˜T`2, p˜T`1, εq “ max
x˜T`1,x˜T`2PRK`
u1,...,uT ,u˜T`1,u˜T`2PR`
u˜T`2 ´ p˜T`2 ¨ x˜T`2 ´ u˜T`1 ` p˜T`1 ¨ x˜T`1
s.t. us ď ur ` pr ¨ pxs ´ xrq ` ε for all r, s P t1, . . . , T u
u˜T`1 ď ur ` pr ¨ px˜T`1 ´ xrq ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
u˜T`2 ď ur ` pr ¨ px˜T`2 ´ xrq ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
ur ď u˜T`1 ` p˜T`1 ¨ pxr ´ x˜T`1q ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
ur ď u˜T`2 ` p˜T`2 ¨ pxr ´ x˜T`2q ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
u˜T`1 ď u˜T`2 ` p˜T`2 ¨ px˜T`1 ´ x˜T`2q ` ε
u˜T`2 ď u˜T`1 ` p˜T`1 ¨ px˜T`2 ´ x˜T`1q ` ε.
Moreover, when V pp˜T`2, p˜T`1, εq is finite it is the minimum of the same problem.
Under Assumption 11 (ε “ ε˚), these bounds cannot be improved.
Note that we do not impose the constraint that if p˜T`2 “ pt for some t, then x˜T`2 “ xt.
This is because the observed demand xt is not known to exactly maximize utility at
the price pt so we must account for the fact that x˜T`2 can differ.
Proof of Proposition A.3 (and Proposition 10). Recall
V pp˜T`2, p˜T`1, εq “ sup
tu|u ε´rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
 
V u,App˜T`2, εq ´ V u,App˜T`1, εq
(
.
For a utility function u, price p˜, and bound on approximate optimization given by ε,
let the set of approximate optimizers be given by
AOupp˜, εq “ tx P RK` | upxq ´ p ¨ x ě Vuppq ´ εu.
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We can write
V pp˜T`2, p˜T`1, εq “ sup
tu|u ε´rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
#
sup
x˜T`2PAOupp˜T`2,εq
`
upx˜T`2q ´ p˜T`2 ¨ x˜T`2˘
´ inf
x˜T`1PAOupp˜T`1,εq
`
upx˜T`1q ´ p˜T`1 ¨ x˜T`1˘+.
We can write the difference as
V pp˜T`2, p˜T`1, εq ď sup
u
x˜T`1,x˜T`2PRK`
upx˜T`2q ´ p˜T`2 ¨ x˜T`2 ´ upx˜T`1q ` p˜T`1 ¨ x˜T`1
s.t. upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ě sup
xPRK`
upxq ´ pt ¨ x´ ε @t P t1, . . . , T u
upx˜T`2q ´ p˜T`2 ¨ x˜T`2 ě sup
xPRK`
upxq ´ p˜T`2 ¨ x´ ε
upx˜T`1q ´ p˜T`1 ¨ x˜T`1 ě sup
xPRK`
upxq ´ p˜T`1 ¨ x´ ε.
The first inequality constraint imposes the requirement that u ε-rationalizes the
dataset. The second inequality constraint only involves the variables x˜T`2, and
so when we take a supremum this is the upper approximate indirect utility
V u,App˜T`2, εq “ Vupp˜T`2q. The third inequality constraint has infimum (over x˜T`1)
at the lower approximate indirect utility V u,App˜T`1, εq.
Consider the feasibility region of this problem. Checking the inequalities for all x is
weakly more restrictive than checking for x P tx1, . . . , xT , x˜T`1, x˜T`2u. Thus, we will
replace the suprema over all x P RK` with a finite collection of inequalities involving
tx1, . . . , xT , x˜T`1, x˜T`2u. In addition, searching over all utility functions to satisfy
these inequalities is weakly more restrictive than searching over all utility numbers.
From these two monotonicity observations, and the fact that the value function is
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monotone in its feasibility region (with regard to set inclusion), we obtain
V pp˜1, p˜0, εq ď sup
x˜T`1,x˜T`2PRK`
u1,...,uT ,u˜T`1,u˜T`2PR`
u˜T`2 ´ p˜T`2 ¨ x˜T`2 ´ u˜T`1 ` p˜T`1 ¨ x˜T`1
s.t. us ď ur ` pr ¨ pxs ´ xrq ` ε for all r, s P t1, . . . , T u
u˜T`1 ď ur ` pr ¨ px˜T`1 ´ xrq ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
u˜T`2 ď ur ` pr ¨ px˜T`2 ´ xrq ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
ur ď u˜T`1 ` p˜T`1 ¨ pxr ´ x˜T`1q ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
ur ď u˜T`2 ` p˜T`2 ¨ pxr ´ x˜T`2q ` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
u˜T`1 ď u˜T`2 ` p˜T`2 ¨ px˜T`1 ´ x˜T`2q ` ε
u˜T`2 ď u˜T`1 ` p˜T`1 ¨ px˜T`2 ´ x˜T`1q ` ε.
We will now show the opposite inequality holds. First, recall that Proposition 2
shows that this program is feasible provided ε ě ε˚. Let u1, . . . , uT , u˜T`1, u˜T`2, x˜T`1,
and x˜T`2 denote some values that are feasible. Construct the augmented dataset
tpxt, ptquT`2t“1 that has pxT`1, pT`1q “ px˜T`1, p˜T`1q and pxT`2, pT`2q “ px˜T`2, p˜T`2q.
Construct a utility function as
u˜pxq “ min
σPΣT`1
#
pσpMq ¨ px´ xσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
pσpmq ¨ pxσpm`1q ´ xσpmqq `Mε
+
,
for x ‰ xT`1, where ΣT`1 is the set of sequences in the augmented dataset that start
with σp1q “ T ` 1, have no cycles, and have length at least M ě 1. Finally, set
u˜pxT`1q “ 0. The proof of Proposition A.2 shows that this function ε-rationalizes the
augmented dataset tpxt, ptquT`2t“1 . Moreover, Proposition A.2 also established
u˜T`2 ´ u˜T`1 ď u˜pxT`2q ´ u˜pxT`1q. (9)
Recall we set pxT`1, pT`1q “ px˜T`1, p˜T`1q and pxT`2, pT`2q “ px˜T`2, p˜T`2q for hypo-
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theticals. We conclude
uT`2 ´ pT`2 ¨ xT`2 ´ puT`1 ´ pT`1 ¨ xT`1q
ď u˜pxT`2q ´ pT`2 ¨ xT`2 ´ pu˜pxT`1q ´ pT`1 ¨ xT`1q
ď V u˜,AppT`2, εq ´ V u˜,AppT`1, εq
ď V pp˜T`2, p˜T`1, εq.
The first inequality uses (9). The second inequality holds because for u˜, xT`2 is an
approximate optimizer given pT`2 and similarly for xT`1. The third inequality is the
definition of the bounds on approximate indirect utility. Since this is true for any
feasible values, we conclude that V pp˜T`2, p˜T`1, εq is obtained by the linear program
described in the proposition. Recall that while we have used suprema throughout, in
this last step since we have established V pp˜T`2, p˜T`1, εq as the (bounded) value of a
linear program, we know the supremum is attained by Lemma C.4.
Finally, we note that the bounds are weakly monotone in ε by Proposition 13. For
ε ă ε˚ we know the bounds are not defined because no utility function ε-rationalizes
the dataset. Thus, the bounds are the tightest possible under Assumption 11 (ε “
ε˚).
Proof of Proposition 11. Step 1 provides the upper bound on V . Step 2 provides the
lower bound on V . Recall that p˜1 “ P S for some S P t1, . . . , T u.
Step 1. Recall from Equation 5 that for any r P t1, . . . , T u and p P RK``,
Vupprq ´ Vuppq ď xr ¨ pp´ prq ` ε.
By summing up such inequalities over sequences, we obtain the upper bound
VuppSq ´ Vupp˜0q ď min
σPΣS
#
xσpMq ¨ pp˜0 ´ pσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
xσpmq ¨ ppσpm`1q ´ pσpmqq `Mε
+
.
Since
V u,AppS, εq ´ V u,App˜0, εq ď VuppSq ´ Vupp˜0q ` ε
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by construction, we prove that
V ppS, p˜0, εq ď min
σPΣS
#
xσpMq ¨ pp˜0 ´ pσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
xσpmq ¨ ppσpm`1q ´ pσpmqq `Mε
+
` ε.
Step 2. We now establish the lower bound for V ppS, p˜0, εq. Define
V 1ppq “ ´min
σPΣS
#
xσpMq ¨ pp´ pσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
xσpmq ¨ ppσpm`1q ´ pσpmqq `Mε
+
.
Let V 1 denote the minimum of V 1ppq over the convex hull of tptuTt“1, which is attained
and finite because V 1 is continuous and the convex hull here is compact. Define
V ppq “ maxtV 1ppq, V 1u.
First we show that V satisfies a set of inequalities that are a dual version of ε-
rationalizability. Duality is considered in more detail in the Supplemental Ap-
pendix C.3, and we use several results from that Appendix.
For some t P t1, . . . , T u, let σ˚,t P ΣS be a sequence that obtains the minimum of
V 1pptq, and let M˚,t be the length of that sequence. We have
´V 1ppq ´ xt ¨ p ď xt ¨ pp´ ptq ` xσ˚,tpM˚,tq ¨ ppt ´ pσ˚,tpM˚,tqq`
M˚,t´1ÿ
m“1
pσ
˚,tpmq ¨ pxσ˚,tpm`1q ´ xσ˚,tpmqq ` pM˚,t ` 1qε´ xt ¨ p
“ ´V 1pptq ´ xt ¨ pt ` ε.
Recall that V ppq ě V 1ppq and V pptq “ V 1pptq for t P t1, . . . , T u. This implies
V ppq ě V pptq ´ xt ¨ pp´ ptq ´ ε (10)
for any t P t1, . . . , T u and any p P RK .
Define uV : RK Ñ RYt´8u by uV pxq “ infpPRK` V ppq`p¨x. Proposition C.1(ii) shows
that uV ε-rationalizes the dataset. Note that since uV pxq ě V 1, uV is everywhere
finite.
The function V is the maximum of finitely many affine functions, each weakly de-
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creasing in p, and is hence continuous, weakly decreasing, and convex. We conclude
from Lemma C.7 that V “ VuV . In particular, V is the indirect utility function for
uV and we have established that uV ε-rationalizes the dataset. We conclude that
V ppSq ´ V pp˜0q ď V uV ,AppS, εq ´ V uV ,App˜0, εq ď V ppS, p˜0, εq. (11)
We now characterize V ppSq ´ V pp˜0q to state the lower bound on the proposition.
Since pS is in the convex hull of prices, V ppSq “ V 1ppSq. Note that V 1ppSq ď 0
because the dataset is ε-rationalized by quasilinear utility (see Lemma C.1); this
relies on the fact that the sum of each sequence defining V 1 makes a cycle because it
begins and ends at pS. In addition, by considering a sequence of length 1, V 1ppSq ě
´ `xS ¨ ppS ´ pSq ` ε˘ “ ´ε. Thus,
V ppSq ´ V pp˜0q ě ´ε´ V pp˜0q
“ min
σPΣS
#
xσpMq ¨ pp˜0 ´ pσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
xσpmq ¨ ppσpm`1q ´ pσpmqq `Mε
+
´ ε.
So from (11),
V ppS, p˜0, εq ě min
σPΣS
#
xσpMq ¨ pp˜0 ´ pσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
xσpmq ¨ ppσpm`1q ´ pσpmqq `Mε
+
´ ε
“ hpp˜0q ´ ε,
establishing the lower bound.
It is worth noting that the arguments above rely on the inequality ´ε ď V ppSq ď 0.
If we instead rely on the true value for V ppSq we actually prove the stronger result
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here that
V ppS, p˜0, εq ě min
σPΣS
#
xσpMq ¨ pp˜0 ´ pσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
xσpmq ¨ ppσpm`1q ´ pσpmqq `Mε
+
´ min
σPΣS
#
xσpMq ¨ ppS ´ pσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
xσpmq ¨ ppσpm`1q ´ pσpmqq `Mε
+
“ hpp˜0q
´ min
σPΣS
#
xσpMq ¨ ppS ´ pσpMqq `
M´1ÿ
m“1
xσpmq ¨ ppσpm`1q ´ pσpmqq `Mε
+
.
Thus, the lower bound hpp˜0q stated in the proposition can be tightened a bit.
Proof of Proposition 12. Recall for this proof we consider when K “ 1 so quantities
and prices are scalar. We suppress dot product notation for this proof. We first show
that when p˜1 ą mintp1, . . . , pT , p˜0u,
V pp˜1, p˜0, 0q ď
ż 1
0
x1ptp˜1 ` p1´ tqp˜0, 0q
`
p˜0 ´ p˜1˘ dt.
For any utility u function that admits maximizers over p ą mintp1, . . . , pT , p˜0u, write
xuppq P argmax
xPR`
upxq ´ px
for some selector from the argmax correspondence. We first argue
V pp˜1, p˜0, 0q “ sup
tuPU |u rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
ż
xu
`
tp˜1 ` p1´ tqp˜0˘ `p˜0 ´ p˜1˘ dt
where the supremum is over the set of utility functions U that admit a maximizer
over p ą mintp1, . . . , pT , p˜0u.
To that end, note that p˜1 P CCoptptuTt“1 Y p˜0q. From Proposition 13, V pp˜1, p˜0, 0q can
be written as a supremum of differences in indirect utility, where each indirect utility
Vu is finite for p ě tp1, . . . , pT , p˜0u. Each Vu is convex, and for such functions, the
subdifferential
BVuppq “ tx P R` | Vupp˜q ě Vuppq ` xpp˜´ pq @p˜ P R``u
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is nonempty for any p ą mintp1, . . . , pT , p˜0u. See the proof of Lemma C.2. We
can construct a function x˜Vu by selecting from the subdifferential, so that for each
p ą mintp1, . . . , pT , p˜0u
x˜Vuppq P BVuppq.
Any such function satisfies the formula
Vupp˜1q ´ Vupp˜0q “
ż 1
0
x˜Vu
`
tp˜1 ` p1´ tqp˜0˘ `p˜0 ´ p˜1˘ dt. (12)
See for example Rockafellar [2015], Corollary 24.2.1, or Chambers and Echenique
[2017], Theorem 2. (The selector x˜Vuppq is always Reimann integrable.)
We note that for any Vu such that u ε-rationalizes the dataset, the utility function
uVupxq “ infpPRK V ppq`px also ε-rationalizes the dataset from Lemma C.1. Moreover,
uVu is concave, weakly increasing, and satisfies VuVu “ Vu from Lemmas C.6 and C.7.
From this and the proof of Lemma C.2 we conclude that x˜Vu is a maximizer of uVu .
Summing up, we conclude that it is without loss of generality to consider utility
functions U that induce a maximizer for all p ą mintp1, . . . , pT , p˜0u..
Putting these arguments together, we conclude that
V pp˜1, p˜0, 0q “ sup
tu|u rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
 
V u,App˜1, 0q ´ V u,App˜0, 0q
(
“ sup
tu|u rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
 
Vupp˜1q ´ Vupp˜0q
(
“ sup
tuPU |u rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
 
Vupp˜1q ´ Vupp˜0q
(
“ sup
tuPU |u rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
ż 1
0
xu
`
tp˜1 ` p1´ tqp˜0˘ `p˜0 ´ p˜1˘ dt
ď
ż 1
0
x1ptp˜1 ` p1´ tqp˜0, 0q
`
p˜0 ´ p˜1˘ dt.
The first equality is the definition. The second equality uses the fact that when ε “ 0,
the approximate indirect utilities equal the indirect utility. The third equality uses
the arguments above to conclude it is without loss of generality to consider utility
functions that induce a maximizer for p ą mintp1, . . . , pT , p˜0u. The fourth equality
uses (12). The first inequality uses the fact that x1 is a pointwise maximizer of
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demand induced by u that are ε-rationalized by the dataset.
Now it remains to show the opposite inequality. We first show that x1 is the demand
induced by some quasilinear utility function. When K “ 1 and ε “ 0, for p ą
mintp1, . . . , pT , p˜0u, it follows that x1ppq is finite from Proposition 5. Consider the
sets E1 “ tpx1ppq, pqupąmintp1,...,pT ,p˜0u and E2 “ tpxt, ptquTt“1. We argue that for e “
pex, epq P tE1 Y E2u and e1 “ pe1x, e1pq P tE1 Y E2u, the inequality
pex ´ e1xqpep ´ e1pq ď 0
holds. We argue by cases. Indeed, when e, e1 P E1 this follows from Proposition 6.
When e, e1 P E2, the inequality holds by Lemma C.1 and the fact that ε “ 0. When
e P E1 and e1 P E2, the result follows from Equation 3. This covers all cases.
Now consider the set E “ E1 Y E2. From Rockafellar [2015], p. 240 the set E is the
graph of a multivalued mapping that is cyclically monotononically decreasing. From
Rockafellar [2015], Theorem 24.3 there is some lower semicontinuous convex function
f such that for any e “ pex, epq P E,
´ex P Bfpepq,
where Bf denotes the subdifferential of f .24 Let f˚ denote the convex conjugate of
f , which is defined in Appendix C.3. We conclude from Rockafellar [2015], Theorem
23.5 that for each e “ pex, epq P E,
´ex P argmax
x
xep ´ f˚pxq.
Since ex ě 0, we conclude via a change in variables that
ex P argmax
xě0
´xep ´ f˚p´xq.
We conclude that by setting u˜pxq “ ´f˚p´xq, we have for each e P E, the price
ep induces the demand ex as some exact maximizer of a quasilinear utility function.
24Note that we differ from the statement of Theorem 24.3 in Rockafellar [2015] because we consider
cyclically monotonically decreasing mappings while that result considers increasing mappings; this
is why we need to take a negative involving ex.
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In particular, recalling E “ E1 Y E2 and using that E1 is the graph of x1 over
p ą mintp1, . . . , pT , p˜0u, we conclude that x1 is a demand function generated by
quasilinear utility with u˜. Moreover, recall u˜ rationalizes the dataset. Thus,ż
x1ptp˜1 ` p1´ tqp˜0qdt
`
p˜0 ´ p˜1˘
ď sup
tuPU |u rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
ż 1
0
xu
`
tp˜1 ` p1´ tqp˜0˘ `p˜0 ´ p˜1˘ dt
“ V pp˜1, p˜0, 0q.
Proof of Proposition 13. To show shape restrictions on V pp˜1, p˜0, εq, recall
V pp˜1, p˜0, εq “ sup
tu|u ε´rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
 
V u,App˜1, εq ´ V u,App˜0, εq
(
,
where the supremum is over u such that V u,App˜0, εq ‰ 8. For any u that ε-rationalizes
the data, we can add or subtract a constant to u and the new utility function ratio-
nalizes the data as well. In addition, if we let u` a be the utility u plus the constant
a, then
V u,App˜1, εq ´ V u,App˜0, εq “ V u`a,App˜1, εq ´ V u`a,App˜0, εq.
Thus, it is thus without loss of generality to restrict u such that V u,App˜0, εq “ 0. Now
recall the upper approximate indirect utility satisfies V u,App˜1, εq “ Vupp˜1q. Combining
these arguments we can write
V pp˜1, p˜0, εq “ sup
tu|u ε´rationalizes tpxt,ptquTt“1u
 
Vupp˜1q ´ 0
(
,
where the supremum is over u such that V u,App˜0, εq “ 0. We know that each Vu is
convex, weakly decreasing, and lower semicontinuous by Lemma C.6. Note that this
is true for any u, regardless of whether it is concave or upper semicontinuous.
We conclude that when viewing V pp˜1, p˜0, εq only as a function of p˜1, it is the supremum
(over u) of convex, weakly decreasing, lower semicontinuous functions. It is therefore
convex, weakly decreasing, and lower semicontinuous in p˜1 from Rockafellar [2015],
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Theorems 5.5 and 9.4.
To see that V pp˜1, p˜0, εq is weakly increasing in ε, we recall the characterization as
a linear program in Proposition A.3. The feasibility region of the linear program is
weakly increasing (with regard to set inclusion) in ε, and so the value function of the
problem is weakly increasing in ε.
We now establish the finiteness properties in the proposition. Let p˜1 P CCoptptuTt“1q.
We show V pp˜1, p˜0, εq is finite. We can write
p˜1 ě
Tÿ
t“1
αtp
t
for some nonnegative α1, . . . , αT that sum to 1 where the inequality holds componen-
twise. We have
Vupp˜1q ď Vu
˜
Tÿ
t“1
αtp
t
¸
ď
Tÿ
t“1
αtVupptq,
where the first inequality follows because Vu is weakly decreasing, and the second
inequality follows because Vu is convex. Recall from (5) in the main text that for any
u that ε-rationalizes the dataset, we have
V u,Appt, εq ´ V u,App˜0, εq ď Vupptq ´ Vupp˜0q ` ε ď pxt ¨ pp˜0 ´ ptq ` εq ` ε
for any t P t1, . . . , T u. Combining the previous steps we obtain
V pp˜1, p˜0, εq ď
Tÿ
t“1
αtx
t ¨ pp˜0 ´ ptq ` 2ε ă 8.
Now we show that if p˜1 R CCoptptuTt“1 Y p˜0q, then V pp˜1, p˜0, εq “ 8. First note that
from Proposition 2, there is some utility function that ε-rationalizes the dataset and
has a maximizer at the price p˜0. Let x˜0 denote such a maximizer. Now construct
the augmented dataset tpxt, ptquT`1t“1 , where pxT`1, pT`1q “ px˜0, p˜0q. Note that by con-
struction, there is some utility function u that ε-rationalizes the augmented dataset
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tpxt, ptquT`1t“1 . For any such function u, the indirect utility satisfies Vuppq ă 8 for
any p P CCoptptuTt“1 Y p˜0q from the finiteness arguments above. Thus, it remains
to show that when p R CCoptptuTt“1 Y p˜0q, there is some u that ε-rationalizes the
augmented dataset and satisfies Vuppq “ 8. That end, fix px1, p1q P tpxt, ptquT`1t“1 and
let Σ1 denote the set of finite sequences of t P t1, . . . , T u with no cycles that begins
at σp1q “ 1. Define
Upxq “ min
σPΣ1
#
pσpMq ¨ `x´ xσpMq˘` M´1ÿ
m“1
pσpmq ¨ pxσpm`1q ´ xσpmqq `Mε
+
,
where M corresponds to the length of a particular sequence. Allen and Rehbeck
[2020] have shown that for ε ě ε˚, this function ε-rationalizes the augmented dataset
tpxt, ptquT`1t“1 .
Since p˜1 R CCoptptuTt“1, p˜0q from the separating hyerplane theorem, there is some
x P RK with x ‰ 0 such that
pp´ p˜1q ¨ x ą 0 for all p P CCoptptuTt“1 Y p˜0q.
We argue by contradiction that x contains no negative components. Indeed, suppose
it does so that xk ă 0 for some k. Since p˜1 P RK`` and CCoptptuTt“1 Y p˜0q is upper
comprehensive, we can find some p P CCoptptuTt“1 Y p˜0q with pk high enough so that
pp´ p˜1q ¨ x ă 0. We reach a contradiction and conclude x P RK` and x ‰ 0.
Note that in the definition of Upxq, the minimum is taken over certain functions that
involve pt ¨ x for some t, plus a constant. Thus, for shorthand write
Upxq “ min
tPt1,...,T`1u
min
aPAt
tpt ¨ x` au
for certain finite sets At corresponding to the sums in the construction of Upxq. We
conclude that
lim
λÑ8Upλxq ´ p˜
1 ¨ λx “ lim
λÑ8 mintPt1,...,T`1u
min
aPAt
 ppt ´ p˜1q ¨ λx` a( “ 8.
This establishes that VUpp˜1q “ 8 and so since VUpp˜0q ă 8 we conclude V pp˜1, p˜0, εq ě
VUpp˜1q ´ VUpp˜0q “ 8.
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A.4 Proofs for Section 5
In order to prove Proposition 14, we first prove a lemma. The lemma establishes a
convexity property of the set of counterfactual quantities at a given price,
Xpp˜, D, εq “ tx˜ | px˜, p˜q P CpD, εqu.
Lemma A.1. Let D0 “ tpd0,t, ptquTt“1 and D1 “ tpd1,t, ptquTt“1 differ only for quanti-
ties. If d˜j P X pp˜, Dj, εjq for j P t0, 1u, then for any α P r0, 1s,
αd˜0 ` p1´ αqd˜1 P Xpp˜, αD0 ` p1´ αqD1, αε0 ` p1´ αqε1q.
In addition, the set A described in Proposition 14 is convex.
Proof. The sets CpD, εq and Xpp˜, D, εq can be characterized by using any of the equiv-
alent statements of Lemma C.1, applied to the counterfactual-augmented dataset.
In particular, for an arbitrary (hypothetical) dataset Dj “ tpdj,t, ptquTt“1, d˜j P
X pp˜, Dj, εjq means there are numbers uj,1, . . . , uj,K , u˜j P R` such that
uj,s ď uj,r ` pr ¨ `dj,s ´ dj,r˘` ε for all r, s P t1, . . . , T u
uj ď uj,r ` pr ¨
´
d˜j ´ dj,r
¯
` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u
uj,r ď u˜j ` p˜ ¨
´
dj,r ´ d˜j
¯
` ε for all r P t1, . . . , T u.
In addition, d˜j must be non-negative. We can take a convex combination of the values
for j “ 0 and j “ 1 and the inequalities are preserved. For example, considering the
first inequalities that involve a pair r, s, we have
αu0,s ` p1´ αqu1,s ď αu0,r ` p1´ αqu1,r`
pr ¨ pαd0,s ` p1´ αqd1,s ´ pαd0,r ` p1´ αqd1,rqq ` αε0 ` p1´ αqε1.
Since by Lemma C.1 the inequalities displayed above are the only ones we need to
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check, we obtain that
αd˜0 ` p1´ αqd˜1 P Xpp˜, αD0 ` p1´ αqD1, αε0 ` p1´ αqε1q.
Finally, convexity of A follows from similar averaging of the inequalities characterizing
ε-rationalizability in Lemma C.1(iii).
Proof of Proposition 14. Recall we now include quantities as arguments of the
bounds. In more detail, write
xk pd, p˜, εq “ max
x˜PXpp˜,D,εq
x˜k,
where D “ tpdt, ptquTt“1 and we work in the extended reals so that xkpd, p˜, εq may be
8. Addition is defined as 8` a “ 8 provided a is not ´8.
Let d˜0, d˜1 P RKˆT be arbitrary quantities datasets. Since xk is a maximum, we obtain
xk
´
αd˜0 ` p1´ αqd˜1, p˜, αε0 ` p1´ αqε1
¯
ě αxk
´
d˜0, p˜, ε0
¯
` p1´ αqxk
´
d˜1, p˜, ε1
¯
,
because from Lemma A.1 the weighted average of the values is feasible. This estab-
lishes concavity of xk in its non-price arguments. Since xk is a minimum we obtain
xk
´
αd˜0 ` p1´ αqd˜1, p˜, αε0 ` p1´ αqε1
¯
ď αxk
´
d˜0, p˜, ε0
¯
` p1´ αqxk
´
d˜1, p˜, ε1
¯
,
and so the lower bound is convex in its non-price arguments.
To establish continuity of xkp¨, p˜, ¨q as stated in the proposition, recall the linear pro-
gramming formulation in A.1. We see that quantities d and approximation error ε
enter additively (relative to the choice variables) in the inequalities describing feasi-
bility region. That is, they are part of the “b” in the canonical linear programming
formulation from Appendix C.2. Continuity then follows from Lemma C.4.
Proof of Proposition 15. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 14 and
so we only outline it. Recall that V and V are described by a linear program in
Proposition 10. By inspecting the feasibility region of this program we see convexity
holds similar to Lemma A.1. From this, we conclude that V satisfies the concavity
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property in the proposition because it is a maximum, and V satisfies the convexity
property in the proposition because it is a minimum.
Continuity of V and V in pd, εq over the region where these bounds are finite follows
from the linear programming formulation in Proposition A.3 and Lemma C.4.
Proof of Proposition 16. Convexity is established in Proposition 3 in Allen and Re-
hbeck [2020]. Continuity follows from the linear programming characterization of
ε˚ in Proposition 2 in Allen and Rehbeck [2020]. Indeed, ε˚ can be written as a
maximum of finitely many functions that are affine in quantities d.
Proof of Corollary 1. By assumption xkpd, p˜, ε˚pdqq is finite. By construction,´
dˆn, ε
´
dˆn
¯¯
P A for each n. Then from Propositions 14, 16, and the continuous
mapping theorem, x
´
dˆn, p˜, εpdˆnq
¯
pÝÑ xkpd, p˜, ε˚pdqq. The arguments for x, V , and V
are analogous.
Proof of Proposition 17. First note that the set Apx˜q is convex for any x˜ P RK` be-
cause it is a projection of the set A, which is convex by Lemma A.1. The proof
is analogous to the proofs of Propositions 14 and 15. The feasibility region of the
program describing u and u is given in Proposition A.2. This feasibility regions of u
and u are convex in quantities and degree of approximation error over the sets Apx˜0q
and Apx˜1q respectively, similar to Lemma A.1. Since u is a supremum it is concave,
and since u is an infimum it is convex.
Continuity of u and u in pd, εq over the region stated in the proposition follows from
the characterization of the bounds in Proposition A.2(ii) and (iii). Indeed, u is the
maximum of finitely many functions that are each affine in pd, εq, and u is the mini-
mum.
Appendix B Alternative Approaches
Assumption 1 is the key conceptual assumption for this paper, which posits that
approximation error is the same in new settings as the data we have seen. We have
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operationalized this for counterfactual and welfare analysis with a number controlling
approximation error as in Allen and Rehbeck [2020]. We now describe other poten-
tial ways to conduct counterfactual or welfare analysis. We also elaborate on the
measurement and prediction wedges.
This paper focuses on approximation error being controlled by a single scalar. An
alternative approach is to consider a multidimensional notion along the lines of Afriat
[1972], Varian [1990], Varian [1991], Halevy et al. [2018], and Masten and Poirier
[2018b]. We pursue this by allowing each observation to have its own value εtV of
approximation error relative to exact optimization.
Definition B.1. A dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1 is εV-rationalized by quasilinear utility for
εV “ pε1V, . . . , εTVq P RT` if there exists a utility function u : RK` Ñ R such that for all
t P t1, . . . , T u and for all x P RK` , the following inequality holds:
upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt` ě upxq ´ pt ¨ x´ εtV.
We also refer to the above by saying a dataset is εV-quasilinear rationalized.
We can apply this concept to counterfactual analysis, as in the main text, by con-
sidering datasets in which the last observation is the hypothetical. That is, for a
dataset tpxt, ptquT`1t“1 , interpret the first T observations as data we have seen and the
last T ` 1 observation as be the hypothetical. In this case, the measurement wedges
are controlled by the collection pε1V , . . . , εTV q of values for the observed data, while
the prediction wedge is the scalar εT`1V . In principle we can consider counterfactuals
involving several observations such as T ` 1 and T ` 2. We focus on the case of a
single counterfactual for brevity.
In the main text, we set a single number controlling the measurement wedge and
the prediction wedge. The full strength of Assumption 11 also imposes that these are
equal to the minimal approximation error needed to explain the data we have seen.
In this appendix we drop the assumptions that these wedges are the same, which
shows how to generalize our framework when Assumption 11 is relaxed.
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B.1 Counterfactuals with Multidimensional Approximation
Error
Because εV -rationalization is multidimensional, in general there is no single “smallest”
vector εV such that the dataset is εV -rationalized by quasilinear utility. Nonetheless,
we can define a set of such rationalizing vectors via
E
´
D˜
¯
“
!
εV P RT` | D˜ is εV -quasilinear rationalized
)
,
where we let D˜ “ ppx1, p1q, . . . , pxT , pT qq be the observed dataset written as an ordered
tuple. Note that we switch from an unordered dataset to an ordered tuple. The
reason we care about the order of observations now is that the t-th dimension of
E
´
D˜
¯
corresponds to approximation error associated with the t-th observation. We
can conduct counterfactual analysis as before by considering the set of quantity-price
tuples that do not make approximation error worse.
Formalizing worse here leads to some ambiguity since we do not have a total order
on vectors. We consider two possibilities. To formalize these, let piT : RT`1 Ñ RT
denote the projection onto the first T components. We can then define the sets of
lower and upper approximate counterfactuals by
AC
´
D˜
¯
“
!
px˜, p˜q P RK` ˆ RK`` | piT
´
E
´
D˜ ˆ px˜, p˜q
¯¯
“ E
´
D˜
¯)
AC
´
D˜
¯
“
!
px˜, p˜q P RK` ˆ RK`` | piT
´
E
´
D˜ ˆ px˜, p˜q
¯¯
X E
´
D˜
¯
‰ H
)
.
With minor abuse of notation we define Ep¨q in the obvious way for datasets of
different dimensions. Clearly, AC
´
D˜
¯
Ď AC
´
D˜
¯
. The smaller set formalizes that
counterfactuals do not change the potential εV vectors that rationalize the data we
see when we add an existing observation. This smaller set is conceptually closer to the
original adapative counterfactual set ACp¨q. The larger set formalizes that there is
some εV vector that εV -rationalizes both the original dataset and the counterfactual-
augmented dataset D˜ ˆ px˜, p˜q.
While the sets AC and AC may appear to be intuitive alternatives to the adaptive
approach presented in the main text, unfortunately these sets are trivial. To see this,
note that the set AC
´
D˜
¯
allows the prediction wedge εT`1V for the counterfactual
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value to be unbounded. This leads to trivial restrictions for both AC
´
D˜
¯
and the
larger set AC
´
D˜
¯
. However, nontriviality can be restored if we modify the sets
by placing an a priori bound on approximation error at the new observation. To
formalize this, let pi : RT`1 Ñ R denote the projection of the last component. Then
we can modify the smaller set via
AC 1
´
D˜, εT`1V
¯
“
!
px˜, p˜q PRK` ˆ RK`` | piT
´
E
´
D˜ ˆ px˜, p˜q
¯¯
“ E
´
D˜
¯
,
pi
´
E
´
D˜ ˆ px˜, p˜q
¯¯
ď εT`1V
)
.
Thus, the prediction wedge is restricted by the number εT`1V . This set is not data-
adaptive in the sense that εT`1V needs to be chosen by the researcher. However, one
can make this data adaptive by using information obtained from other measures of
approximation error discussed below.
B.2 Other Measures of Approximation Error
It is natural to wonder for the multidimensional vector of approximation errors, εV ,
whether other intuitive one-dimensional summaries can be used for counterfactual
analysis. In fact, there can be many ways to do this depending on how one aggre-
gates the approximation error. We consider general aggregators of the elements of
multidimensional approximation error εV that turn it into a one-dimensional measure
of approximation error. Formally, an aggregator can be written eT : RT` Ñ r0,8q.
Higher values of the aggregator can be interpreted as more approximation error. Var-
ian [1990] and Halevy et al. [2018] consider a related notion in the standard consumer
problem for general utility maximization.25
Given a dataset D˜ “ ppx1, p1q, . . . , pxT , pT qq and an aggregator eT , we can define a
measure of approximation error via
eT˚
´
D˜
¯
“ inf
εV PEpD˜q
eT pεV q.
25Many of the convenient shape restrictions we obtain in this paper do not hold for the case of
general utility maximization since the constraint set of consistent utility indices is non-convex.
65
One such aggregator is the max aggregator of eTMpεV q “ maxtPT εtV . The measure of
approximation error for the max aggregator agrees with the one presented in the main
text, i.e. eTM˚ “ ε˚. In general, an aggregator can depend on the sample size. For
example, consider the average approximation error aggregator eTApεV q “ 1T
řT
t“1 ε
t
V .
Our leading measure, ε˚, does not depend on T .
For an arbitrary aggregator, similar to how AC was constructed with the measure
ε˚, we can define a set of counterfactuals such that approximation error does not get
worse: !
px˜, p˜q P RK` ˆ RK`` | epT`1q˚
´
D˜ ˆ px˜, p˜q
¯
ď eT˚
´
D˜
¯)
. (13)
This construction does not separately control the prediction wedge and approximation
wedge as in AC’ described at the end of the previous subsection. Instead, it lumps
together both prediction and approximation wedges via the aggregators epT`1q˚ and
eT˚.
To understand properties of this set, consider an aggregator that sums up the
observation-specific bounds on approximate optimization, eTS pεV q “
řT
t“1 ε
t
V . With
this choice of aggregator, each conjectured observation in (13) must be perfectly con-
sistent with the model, i.e. εT`1V “ 0, for approximation error to not be made worse.
In other words, for each element of (13), there must exist some utility function that
approximately explains the existing dataset D˜, but exactly explains the counterfac-
tual. Thus, there is no prediction wedge. This property may be desirable when one
thinks the observed dataset D˜ comes from a “true” dataset that is generated by the
quasilinear model but has been measured with error. Using the previous terminology,
in this case we may wish to conduct counterfactual analysis without a prediction
wedge. If instead we think approximation error propogates to new settings, then
we may wish to allow the prediction wedge. This is one motivation for ε˚ and the
adaptive set AC.
One potential way to address this limitation of the sum-type aggregator eTS is to adjust
it by dividing by the sample size to obtain the average approximation error aggregator
so that e˜T˚A “ 1T eT˚S . This division allows one to construct a set analogously to (13)
that allows a prediction wedge when generating counterfactual information.
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Appendix C Supplemental Appendix
This appendix contains additional results needed for proofs of the main results. Sec-
tion C.1 contains miscellaneous lemmas, Section C.2 presents lemmas specifically for
linear programming results, and Section C.3 presents duality results used in proofs
for approximate indirect utility in Section 4.2.
C.1 Miscellaneous Lemmas
Lemma C.1 (Allen and Rehbeck [2020]). For any dataset tpxt, ptquTt“1 and ε ě 0,
the following are equivalent:
(i) tpxt, ptquTt“1 is ε-rationalized by quasilinear utility.
(ii) There exist numbers tutuTt“1 that satisfy the following inequalities for all r, s P
t1, . . . , T u:
us ď ur ` pr ¨ pxs ´ xrq ` ε.
(iii) For all finite sequences ttmuMm“1 with tm P t1, . . . , T u and M ě 2, the inequality
1
M
Mÿ
m“1
ptm ¨ pxtm ´ xtm`1q ď ε
holds, where pxtM`1 , ptM`1q “ pxt1 , pt1q.
We require a lemma that will be used in the proof of Proposition 2 to ensure a max-
imizer exists. In contrast with models with compact budget constraints, continuity
of the utility function u is not enough to ensure a maximizer exists, which is why we
require the following lemma. To state the lemma, recall that for a utility function u,
the indirect utility is defined as
Vuppq “ sup
xPRK`
upxq ´ p ¨ x.
Lemma C.2. Suppose u : RK` Ñ R is concave, monotonically increasing, and con-
tinuous. Moreover, suppose Vuppq is finite over some open set O Ď RK. It follows
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that for any price p P ripCopOqq,26
upxq ´ p ¨ x
admits a maximizer for x P R`.
Proof of Lemma C.2. Since Vuppq is convex and finite over O, then Vuppq is finite on
the ripCopOqq. Thus, the subdifferential
BVuppq “
 
x | Vupp˜q ě Vuppq ` x ¨ pp˜´ pq @p˜ P RK
(
is nonempty for any p P ripCopOqq by Rockafellar [2015], Theorem 23.4. Extend u
to all of RK by setting upxq “ ´8 for any x P RKzRK` . Recall that the original u
defined on RK` is continuous, so that it is upper semicontinuous and tx | upxq ě au is
closed for any a P R by Theorem 7.1 in Rockafellar [2015]. Note that the extension
is also upper semicontinuous because it does not change the topological properties of
the upper contour sets for all a P R. Since u is upper semicontinuous and concave,
we conclude from Rockafellar [2015] Theorem 23.5 parts pbq and pa˚q that for any
p P ripCopOqq there is some x˚ P RK such that
upxq ´ p ¨ x
is maximized over x P R at x˚ since BVuppq is nonempty. Since u is ´8 outside of
RK` , we conclude x˚ P RK` . This establishes existence of an exact maximizer for the
utility function u over the region p P ripCopOqq, which completes the proof.
26For a set S Ď RK , ripSq gives the relative interior of the set S as defined in Rockafellar [2015].
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C.2 Linear Programming Lemmas
We require some existing results from the theory of linear programming. In canonical
form, a linear program is written as
max
xPRJ1
c ¨ x
s.t. Ax ď b
x ě 0.
Here, c, x P RJ1 , and b P RJ2 are vectors and A P RJ2ˆJ1 is a matrix.
This is written as a maximum rather than a supremum because provided the supre-
mum is finite, the maximum is attained as we formalize now.
Lemma C.3. If the value function of a linear program is finite, then the maximum
is attained.
Proof. See e.g. Bertsekas [2009], Proposition 1.4.12.
Fixing all other variables, let B Ď RJ2 be the set of b where the linear program is
bounded. Write the value function as a function of b so that
Gpbq “ sup
x
c ¨ x
s.t. Ax ď b
x ě 0.
Lemma C.4. Let bm Ñ b˚ where b˚ P B and for each bm, the set
tx | Ax ď bm, x ě 0u
is nonempty. It follows that Gpbmq Ñ Gpb˚q.
Proof. Let η ą 0 and define
Gpbq “ mintGpbq, Gpb˚q ` ηu.
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The value Gpbq is the value function of a linear program defined by Gpbq that appends
the inequality constraint c ¨ x ď Gpb˚q ` η. Because Gpb˚q ` η is finite, Gpbq is finite
for any feasible b. Bo¨hm [1975], Theorem 1 states that Gpbq is continuous over the
set of b such that the feasibility region is nonempty. Since bm Ñ b˚ and each bm and
b˚ P B are feasible, we then obtain Gpbmq Ñ Gpb˚q “ Gpb˚q.
C.3 Duality
The focus of the paper is on counterfactuals with approximate utility maximization.
In other words, we consider utility functions u such that the inequality
upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ě upxq ´ pt ¨ x´ ε
holds for every t P t1, . . . , T u and x P RK` . In this supplement, we consider a dual
approach involving functions V such that
V ppq ě V pptq ´ xt ¨ pp´ ptq ´ ε
holds for every t P t1, . . . , T u and p P RK``. We also mention some results from convex
analysis. Results from this section are used to prove several results in the main text.
Our first result formalizes that finding a utility function u that satisfies the first set
of inequalities is equivalent to finding a V function that satisfies the second set of
inequalities.
To state the result, recall the indirect utility function of u is given by Vu : RK` Ñ
RK Y t´8,8u
Vuppq “ sup
xPRK`
upxq ´ p ¨ x.
We make use of a “dual” utility function uV : RK` Ñ RK Y t´8,8u constructed via
uV pxq “ inf
pPRK`
V pxq ` p ¨ x.
These operations can be defined for any extended real-valued functions u : RK Ñ
RK Y t´8,8u and V : RK Ñ RK Y t´8,8u.
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Proposition C.1. Let ε ě 0 and let tpxt, ptquTt“1 be an arbitrary dataset.
i. Suppose u : RK` Ñ R satisfies
upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ě upxq ´ pt ¨ x´ ε
for every t P t1, . . . , T u and every x P RK` . It follows that Vu satisfies
Vuppq ě Vupptq ´ xt ¨ pp´ ptq ´ ε
for every t P t1, . . . , T u and every p P RK` .
ii. Suppose V : RK` Ñ R satisfies
V ppq ě V pptq ´ xt ¨ pp´ ptq ´ ε
for every t P t1, . . . , T u and every p P RK` . It follows that uV satisfies
uV pxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ě uV pxq ´ pt ¨ x´ ε
for every t P t1, . . . , T u and every x P RK` .
Proof. First we show (i). For arbitrary t P t1, . . . , T u, write
Vupptq “ upxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ` δt (14)
where δt “ Vupptq ´ upxtq ` pt ¨ xt ě 0 and δt ď ε since the observed quantities are
only approximately optimal. For arbitrary p P RK` we have
Vuppq ě upxtq ´ p ¨ xt.
Differencing yields
Vuppq ´ Vupptq ě ´xt ¨ pp´ ptq ´ δt.
The term Vuppq may equal 8, in which case we define 8 ´ a “ 8 for any finite
a. Here, Vupptq is finite from (14) and the fact that u is finite. We know for all
t P t1, . . . , T u that 0 ď δt ď ε by assumption, so (i) is established.
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Now we show (ii). As before, write
uV pxtq “ V pptq ` pt ¨ xt ´ δt
where δt “ uV pxtq ´ V pptq ´ pt ¨ xt ě 0 and δ ď ε since the observed quantities and
prices are only supposed to satisfy the inequality in (ii) for V . For arbitrary x P RK`
we have
uV pxq ď V pptq ` pt ¨ x,
and so
uV pxtq ´ pt ¨ xt ě uV pxq ´ pt ¨ x´ δt.
As before, uV pxq can equal ´8, but uV pxtq is always finite. Recall, for all t P
t1, . . . , T u that 0 ď δt ď ε by assumption, and so (ii) is established.
The mappings uÑ Vu and V Ñ uV are closely related to convex conjugates, and we
can adapt existing results from convex analysis. Recall that for a function f : RK Ñ
RY t´8,8u, the convex conjugate is given by
f˚ppq “ sup
xPRK
p ¨ x´ fpxq.
The monotone conjugate is given by
f`ppq “ sup
xPRK`
p ¨ x´ fpxq.
Let the function f˜ equal f over x P RK` , and 8 otherwise. It follows that f˜˚ppq “
f`ppq.
We now formalize the relationships between uV and Vu and monotone conjugates.
Following this, we present some immediate consequences.
Lemma C.5.
uV pxq “ ´V `p´xq
and
Vuppq “ p´uq`p´pq.
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Proof.
uV pxq “ inf
pPRK`
V ppq ` p ¨ x “ ´ sup
pPRK`
´V ppq ´ p ¨ x “ ´V `p´xq.
and
Vuppq “ sup
xPRK`
upxq ´ p ¨ x “ sup
xPRK`
´p´upxqq ` p´pq ¨ x “ p´uq`p´pq.
Lemma C.6. The function uV is concave, weakly increasing, and upper semicontin-
uous. The function Vu is convex, weakly decreasing, and lower semicontinuous.
Proof. To see that Vu is weakly decreasing, consider p
a, pb with pa ě pb. For x P RK`
we have pa ¨ x ě pb ¨ x and so
Vuppaq “ sup
xPRK`
upxq ´ pa ¨ x ď sup
xPRK`
upxq ´ pb ¨ x ď Vuppbq.
Also, Vu is convex and lower semicontinuous from Bertsekas [2009], p. 83. The
arguments for uV are analogous by applying Lemma C.5.
Lemma C.7. i. Suppose u : RK` Ñ RK Y t´8,8u is concave, weakly increasing,
upper semicontinuous, and finite at 0. Then uVu “ u.
ii. Suppose V : RK` Ñ RK Y t´8,8u is concave, weakly decreasing, lower semicon-
tinuous, and finite at 0. Then VuV “ V .
Proof. Write f`` as the monotone conjugate of f`. Rockafellar [2015], Theorem 12.4
states V `` “ V and p´uq`` “ ´u. From Lemma C.5 we conclude
´uVupxq “ pVuq`p´xq “ p´uq``pxq “ ´upxq
and
VuV ppq “ p´uV q`p´pq “ V ``ppq “ V ppq.
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